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C NT WORLD TRADE AGENDA: GATT,
REGIONALISM, AND UNRESOLVED
ASYMMETRY PROBLEMS'
WILLIAM A. LOVETT*"
INTRODUCTION
F IFTY Years after Bretton Woods is a good occasion for reappraisal
of the post-World War II Economic Settlement.1 With Commu-
nism's recent collapse, and a movement toward freer markets and greater
democracy in many countries, the role of the IMF, World Bank, and
GATT requires honest rethinking. Because the world has changed
greatly, some adjustments in the global financial-trading regime are
needed. A very serious challenge is the unresolved asymmetry problem,
which produces strain and insecurities for many trading relationships,
and has contributed to recent United States economic sluggishness.
Substantial asymmetries rooted in the GATT, unequal economic de-
velopment for various countries, different regional arrangements, and di-
vergent industrial policies are now built into the world marketplace.2
Although done generally and often selectively, many developing coun-
* Address given by Professor William A. Lovett on November 4, 1993 as part of the
Fordham University School of Law Graduate Colloquium 1993-1994.
** Joseph Merrick Jones Professor of Law and Economics, and Director, Tulane
International Law, Trade and Finance Program, Tulane Law School. The author grate-
fully acknowledges extensive research assistance from the following Tulane law school
students: Stephen Behar, Jennifer M. Goldstein, Wei Jia, Kerry Lewis, Rosendo Lopez-
Mata, Ian M. Wilkie, and Jong Chan Wooh. Special thanks to my legal assistant, Kathy
T. Werling, for her dedication and support.
1. Leading allied economists gathered at Bretton Woods toward the end of World
War II. Their dominant concerns were: (i) the Allies' plan for financing reconstruction
and development of the post-war countries and (ii) that trade be freer and enlarged in the
post-war environment so that broader, stronger economic development would follow.
The principle consequences of this gathering were the International Monetary Fund
("IMF'), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later the World
Bank), the creation of the International Trade Organization ("ITO"-which failed to
achieve sufficient support), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").
For a convenient bibliography, see William A. Lovett, World Trade Rivalry: Trade Eq-
uity and Competing Industrial Policies 38-40 (1987) [hereinafter Lovett, World Trade
Rivalry].
2. See Raymond M. Frost, Losing Economic Hegemony: U.K. 1850-91 and U.S
1950-90, Challenge, July-Aug. 1992, at 30-34; William A. Lovett, Rethinking US Indus-
trial-Trade Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, I Tul. J. of Int'l & Comp. L. 135, 135-83
(1993) [hereinafter Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade Policy]. See generally, John
M. Culbertson, International Trade and the Future of the West (1984); John M. Culbert-
son, The Trade Threat and U.S. Trade Policy (1989); Robert Kuttner, The End of Lais-
sez-Faire: National Purpose and the Global Economy After the Cold War (1991); Clyde
V. Prestowitz, Jr., Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead (1988);
Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and
America (1992). The asymmetry problem also has been analyzed extensively in Lovett,
World Trade Rivalry, supra note 1, at 8-11, 52-53, 75-96, 105-28.
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tries strongly promote industrial expansion with subsidies, tax relief,
favorable financing, and differential exchange rates. They widely employ
restrictions designed to cushion domestic industries, at least in part, from
the impact of foreign competition, support measures, discounting and/or
dumping. Many advanced industrial countries use such industrial and
trade policies, too, although successive GATT rounds tried to encourage
more openness and less subsidation among the more affluent industrial
nations. A double standard that favors developing nations is implicit in
these arrangements. This inequality was introduced at the outset of
GATT to foster a spread of technology, industries, and prosperity
around the globe, and it has become hardened into practice under the
GATT and United States trade policies.
Within the last fifty years, global industrialization and growth have
spread more widely than before.' Today, most of the countries in Asia,
Latin America, and the Middle East are new industrial countries. Some
of these nations (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and even China)
strongly challenge older industrial leaders, such as the United States,
United Kingdom, France, and Germany. International capital forma-
tion, savings, investment and lending flows also have spread more
widely.' In 1945, the United States was the large source of investment
capital; now East Asia, Western Europe, and North America are roughly
equal as large accumulations of capital. Even parts of the Middle East
and Latin America enjoy substantial financial flows and investment re-
sources. In addition, the IMF and World Bank enjoy much larger capi-
talization and stronger borrowing capacity, and serve as critical catalysts
for allocating and screening investment funding to debtor and developing
countries.' This more equal spread of industrial prosperity was a major
3. See the last 25 years of the annual World Bank Atlas, the World Bank, Wash.,
D.C. (1992), which traces the uneven spread of economic development among the various
countries. See also, Lloyd G. Reynolds, Economic Growth in the Third World, 1850-
1980, at 387-418 (1985) (discussing comparative growth performance from 1950-80). See
generally James Foreman-Peck, A History of the World Economy: International Eco-
nomic Relations Since 1850 (1983).
4. See Lovett, World Trade Rivalry, supra note 1, at 21-73; see also Lovett, Rethink-
ing U.S. Industrial-Trade Policy, supra note 2, at n. 12 (comparing the divergent economic
growth rates of key countries, from 1953 to 1989: U.S., $2,310 to $21,000; U.K. $940 to
$14,570; Germany, $740 to $20,750; Italy, $430 to $15,150; Japan, $230 to $23,730;
Spain, $340 to $9,150; Switzerland, $1,150 to $30, 270; Taiwan $100 to $7,190; and South
Korea, $152 to $4,400).
For additional discussion of the development of the global economy, see generally
Michael R. Czinkota, et al., International Business (2d ed. 1992); Charles P. Kin-
dleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe (1984); Franklin R. Root, Interna-
tional Trade and Investment (7th ed. 1993) [hereinafter Root 7th ed.]. Note that,
according to the World Bank Atlas (1992), the U.S.-Canada GNP was $6,250 billion,
Western Europe's GNP was $5,250 billion, and Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and
Singapore had a total GNP of $4,000 billion. With subsequent currency realignment,
these three blocks had roughly equal GNPs in 1993.
5. See, for example, the most recent annual reports of the IMF and the World Bank,
and compare early versions. The IMF's initial capitalization was $8 billion, but in 1992
the IMF's capitalization was scheduled to reach SDR $145 billion (about $210 billion),
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achievement, which was the objective of the GATT, IMF, and World
Bank. But now it is time for the United States to focus on the asymmetry
problem, rejuvenate its industrial growth, and achieve more balanced
trade flows.
The world economy is stronger today. Many countries have estab-
lished self-sustaining industrial growth, and the diffusion of economic
prosperity allows broader confidence in the notion that the benefits of
industrial-technological progress can really be extended to the remainder
of our globe. But serious medium-term challenges remain: 6 (i) the for-
mer Soviet Union and East European states, although technologically ad-
vanced with reasonably well-educated work forces, need substantial
outside investment and trade to foster their transformation into market-
oriented economies; (ii) the three leading world economies, the United
States, Japan, and Germany, have slowed recently, for somewhat differ-
ent reasons, and cannot serve as jump-starting locomotives for a rapid
resurgence of world growth; (iii) regional blocks are hardening into
place, led by the European Community's strong internal momentum, and
these blocks make big multilateral trade agreements (with major mutual
concessions) more difficult to work out except on a modest, incremental
basis of slow adjustments to current modus vivendi; (iv) sensible nations
realize that they must make the best of their own resources and opportu-
nities, through self-sustaining fiscal responsibility, productive investment
policies, current-account discipline, and skillful trade bargaining. The
global marketplace can be relied upon for reasonable, balanced trade op-
portunities, but not as a big bailout window for governments that cannot
get their acts together.'
A very important lesson from the last fifty years of economic progress
is that some national governments have fostered industrial growth, ex-
port-trade expansion, and sustained productivity advances much more
with major additional borrowing authority. The World Bank began with only $1.6 bil-
lion capital, but enjoyed $175 billion capital in 1993. Meanwhile, private international
banks expanded enormously between 1945-1993. At the close of World War II, Britain's
few major banks-leaders in international banking since the 19th century-were some-
what weakened, German and Japanese banks were in very bad shape, and other Euro-
pean banks (with a few exceptions in Switzerland and Sweden) were substantially
weakened. Only the top ten to twelve U.S. "international" banks came through the War
with strengthened resources, and there was no other nation with strong enough capitali-
zation to offer much help for global recovery and development. The post-war financial
recoveries of Western Europe required substantial U.S. government resources, distributed
mainly through the Marshall Plan and U.S. military assistance. By the early 1990s the
leading international banking journals listed 1000 significant banks from 45 countries.
6. The former U.S.S.R. and Eastern European Countries suffered major dislocations
and output losses in attempting to transform themselves into market-oriented economies.
In contrast, led by many Asian and Latin American nations, developing countries as a
whole were showing improvement, broader growth, and better finances.
7. Access to the IMF, World Bank, and international borrowing resources are soon
depleted by nations that try to run large, sustained current-account deficits without
strong economic growth to justify continued, heavy net foreign investments.
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than have others." The winners used internal and world-market competi-
tion to encourage healthy efficiency. The laggards suffered from a wide
variety of shortcomings like misrule, lack of cohesion, internal disrup-
tions, and waste of budgetary and investment resources. But the world
community generally cannot mobilize the detailed diagnoses, widespread
consensus, or outside resources to provide more than marginal help to
the many troubled and/or failing nations that exist today. The under-
achieving nations must reorganize themselves and provide renewed self-
discipline. And yet, the last fifty years show that relatively open world
markets for capital, exports, and imports provide major opportunities for
productive trade and shared prosperity. The world marketplace is not a
bailout system, but it provides today a stronger network within which
nations can help themselves, so long as they work hard and cohesively.
I. WORLD TRADE LAW FRAMEWORK AND ASYMMETRY PROBLEMS
A. Conflicts Among Mature Industrial Countries, New Industrial
Countries, and Less Developed Countries
Ideally, the world economy should increase gradually the real per cap-
ita incomes and well-being of all countries together. The differential
rates of increase of mature industrial countries, new industrial countries
("NICs"), and less developed countries ("LDCs") should move toward
convergence, with poorer countries gaining more rapidly, so that at some
utopian stage later in the 21st century all of humankind lives well and
happily.9 This scenario implies sensible solutions to the global environ-
mental and population-growth problems.
The heart of international trade-growth conflicts is each nation's desire
to gain respectibility or, at least, not to lose it. International trade bar-
gaining and national policies (macro-economics, industrial development,
and trade) are the instruments through which nations try to achieve
these growth objectives. Success in achieving these objectives requires a
mix of friendly collaboration and rivalry. Most countries struggle to ex-
pand production, strengthen exports, import wisely, and gain higher
levels of output, well-paid employment and family incomes. But in their
eagerness to foster and subsidize industrial growth, exports, and technol-
ogy, it seems unavoidable that surges of output often will displace or
8. Among the strongest sustained growth economies of the post-World War II era
have been Japan, Germany, Switzerland, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea. More
recently, the P.R.C. has done well in the last decade, and Spain has prospered more than
most countries (from a lower base) in Western Europe since the 1970s. See Lovett,
World Trade Rivalry, supra note 1, tbl. P-2.
9. Most humane leaders now understand that economic development should be
shared more equally over the long-run, and that real growth must be the calculated net of
environmental degradation. Increasingly, the danger of excessive population growth and
overcrowding is becoming a real and substantial concern for the future. See generally
Miguel Santos, Managing Planet Earth: Perspectives on Population, Ecology, and the
Law (1990); Klaus F. Zimmerman, Economic Theory of Optimal Population (W. Guth
et al. eds., 1989).
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threaten the production and livelihoods of others. Understandably, na-
tional governments must work out efforts to safeguard, offset, and allevi-
ate these problems.10
Meanwhile, multinational corporations ("MNCs") operate indepen-
dently in this maelstrom, pursuing their own agendas of growth, profits,
and rivalry. Although national governments should try to supervise and
regulate MNCs (particularly when MNCs form a substantial part of do-
mestic commerce), competition among host states often induces coun-
tries to offer special tax relief and encouragements to MNCs. In fact,
MNCs have become the most important beneficiaries of the accumulated
GATT agreements and very powerful advocates who protect their inter-
ests within the international trading regime.I1
B. GAT and the United States International Trade Law Regime
Successive GATT rounds tried to regulate, within limits, and reduce
protectionist rivalries among trading nations. But built into the original
GATT (1947) provisions were substantial concessions to developing na-
tions: especially GATT Articles II, VI, XII, XVI, XVIII, and XIX, to-
gether with IMF, Articles of Agreement VI and XIV (1945). The United
States and United Kingdon were key players in early GATT rounds, and
their collective sense of responsibility for newly liberated colonies and
Latin American nations led them to concede non-reciprocal leeway for
more subsidies, protectionism, and multiple exchange rates to less devel-
oped countries. 12
10. A major function of the GATT (1947) as a framework to encourage collaborative
economic progress, and to avoid beggar-thy-neighbor policies, is to allow countries
enough leeway to ease disruptive displacements. Thus, Articles VI (anti-dumping and
subsidy offsets), Article XII (balance of payments relief), Article XVI (subsidy relief),
Article XVIII (aid for economic development), Article XIX (safeguard and emergency
relief), and Article XXI (national security) provide substantial scope for each country to
protect their vital interests from undue disruption as a result of expanding world trade.
To be sure, Part IV (1965) added special concern for the needs of developing countries to
use subsidies and restrictive measures in enhancing their export growth, and for devel-
oped countries to accommodate these needs. But the GATT was never intended to force
countries, not even the U.S., to sacrifice their own long-term economic health, full em-
ployment, continued growth, and prosperity. Strictly speaking, the U.S. could have used
these GATT provisions more effectively to limit U.S. job losses, industrial decline, and
excessive current-account and trade deficits since the late 1970s to early 1980s.
11. Understandably, from MNC perspectives, they would like a world investment
environment in which their new plant, expansion, marketing, employment, layoff, and
relocation decisions are completely untrammeled. Thus, they can focus entirely upon
minimizing costs, expanding sales, and enlarging profits. Thus, MNCs desire favorable
interpretations of the GATT, a so-called "liberal" global economy, and most of the pro-
posed Dunkel draft Uruguay GATT Round deal. This circumstance minimizes their risk
of any serious assertion of national policies to offset dumping, subsidies, trade imbalances,
or to achieve or maintain full employment that could interfere with their interests.
12. The basic theme of unconditional most-favored-nation treatment under Article II
strongly favors the interests of weaker and smaller trading nations, i.e., most NICs and
LDCs. In addition, the remedies for dumping or subsidies under Article VI would rarely
come into play against smaller countries or exporters, because sufficient "material injury"
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Nonetheless, GATT (at least until 1994) and United States national
trade law still allowed considerable leeway for sensible United States ad-
justments and offsets to foreign subsidies, restrictions, and discounting.
The problem, according to many United States domestic manufacturing,
labor, and agricultural interests, is that recent United States presidential
administrations (at least for the last ten to fifteen years) have failed to
respond effectively to the increasing competitive challenge of successful
foreign industrial policies, subsidies, and widespread discounting. Thus,
the preferential "edge" for LDCs and NICs that was built into the origi-
nal GATT (1947), GATT-Part IV (1965), and various GATT (1979)
Codes, such as the Subsidies Code, has not been adequately offset by
United States presidential administrations and trade authorities. Had the
United States used its own GATT and national-law-trade remedies more
skillfully and resolutely, most of the asymmetry problem could have been
obviated. The United States could have sharply limited excessive im-
ports, trade, and current-account deficits. If it had, the United States
would have suffered much less industrial and job diplacement. The
United States also could have implemented a comprehensive industrial-
rejuvenation policy in the early 1980s, which would have rejuvenated a
substantial part of the United States industrial base.' 3
would be unlikely. Balance of payments problems (deficits) were anticipated mainly from
the weaker nations and those most disrupted from World War II, so that Article XII -
XIV balance of payments relief provisions were designed originally for them. Few would
have contemplated U.S. employment of Article XII measures, and they were intended
more for smaller countries, whose restrictions would not restrict trade seriously among
larger nations. Article XVI on subsidies (and the Subsidies Code of 1979) was designed
more to limit subsidies by larger nations like the U.S. that could seriously disrupt trade;
Article XVI did not seriously limit smaller and developing country subsidies. In fact,
Article XVIII explicitly endorsed government assistance for economic development in
very broad terms, especially for developing nations. Article XIX's safeguard and emer-
gency relief gave more latitude for smaller and developing nations, because "serious in-
jury" was required, and retaliation would be allowed against larger countries. And
GATT Part IV (Articles XXXVI-XXXVIII) (1965) was designed to provide even more
encouragement and special treatment for developing nations in their use of subsidies and
restrictions.
13. If the U.S. had promptly implemented a tougher trade policy along with a strong
industrial rejuvenation strategy in the years 1983-88, and continued these efforts thereaf-
ter, many desirable economic effects could have been achieved: (1) most of the accumu-
lated U.S. $1 trillion current-account deficit could have been eliminated; (2) many U.S.
manufacturing industries would be stronger today; (3) substantial numbers of U.S. jobs
would have been saved-perhaps three to five million; (4) U.S. GDP would be around ten
to fifteen percent larger today; and (5) U.S. budget deficits could have been reduced by
$500-800 billion cumulatively (with at least $800-1,200 billion less U.S. government debt
outstanding). If the agenda outlined herein, or that suggested by Lovett, Kuttner, or
Prestowitz had been implemented, such results could have been achieved. See generally
Kuttner, supra note 2; Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade Policy, supra note 2;
Prestowitz, supra note 2. This would have required either a substantial political change
in the Reagan administration of 1983-188 with tougher trade-industrial policy outlook
(which would have been popular among many congressional Democrats), or, less likely, a
Mondale victory in 1984. Prompt budgetary discipline would have been desirable, too,
with $100 billion or more of deficit reduction annually in 1983-85. But this overall U.S.
under-achievement was the national economic price paid by the U.S. because of a failure
1994] WORLD TRADE AGENDA 2007
Why did the United States fail to respond more effectively with
stronger industrial and trade policies in the last ten to fifteen years?
Three main factors have been at work. 14 First, American presidents, for-
eign policy lobbies, and allied governments felt a need for the United
States to continue "leadership" of the free world democracies. They
feared that, without continued United States leadership toward open
trade in world markets, a rising tide of "protectionism" would soon over-
whelm the global marketplace. The United States feared that a weak-
ened free-world alliance would create greatly increased opportunities for
communists and other enemies of the free world. Thus, international
security needs put a premium on continued United States free-trade lead-
ership, even at the risk of losing "a few industries here and there," and a
reduced United States rate of economic growth. Second, MNC lobbies
(from United States, European, and Japanese companies) worked
strongly and systematically to protect their interests in an open world
trading system. MNCs feared risk to their investments, growth plans,
relocation activities, and profitability if the United States were to assert
or strongly defend its national trade (industrial or labor) interests in any
substantial way. This outlook encompassed the major United States and
other multinational banks, which feared threats to repayment of loans or
other investments in the global marketplace. And high level staffing of
United States trade policy was strongly influenced by prominent MNCs,
to promptly put its economic house in order, and to eliminate the twin U.S. excessive
deficits of the 1980s-90s (including excessive budget deficits and the trade current-ac-
count deficits).
An interesting question for historians will be whether the nomination of Mario Cuomo
in lieu of Michael Dukakis as Democratic candidate in 1988, when then-Vice President
George Bush was not considered a strong Republican successor to President Ronald Rea-
gan, could have resulted in a Cuomo victory, and substantially different domestic and
international economic policies from 1989 and beyond. Politically, many believe that
Cuomo missed his best chance for the Presidency in 1988. For Cuomo's likely economic
policies see The Cuomo Commission on Competitiveness, America's Agenda: Rebuilding
Economic Strength: The Critical Issues of 1993 and Beyond and What To Do About
Them (Lee Smith ed., 1992).
14. The case for a stronger U.S. trade-industrial policy has been stated forcefully by
many authors, with an increasing accumulation of voices and experts. See, e.g., Lovett,
World Trade Rivalry, supra note I, at 8-12, 77-89, 109-25 (citing various sources);
Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade Policy, supra note 2, at nn.2, 18, 28, 44, 52, 62
(same). But the main reasons for continued faith in a relatively unilateral version of U.S.
free-trade policy were (1) special interest lobbying of MNCs, (2) the U.S. foreign policy
establishment (exemplified by most writers in Foreign Affairs 1983-93) or the Institute for
International Economics (1983-93), and (3) a common and recurrent theme of U.S.
thinking that the world should become more like the U.S.: a great federal democracy with
free trade, capital flows, and movement within its borders.
Contrast this recent U.S. elite-establishment thinking with the more cautious outlooks
on trade of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations in the earlier Post World War II
years. See Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Trade Policy, supra note 2, at nn.13-15 and accompa-
nying text. It's interesting that the populist revolt against NAFTA in 1992-93 really
represented widespread public unease about U.S. job stagnation, favoring MNC interests
over those of U.S. workers, and an erosion of confidence in non-reciprocal U.S. free trade
policies as practiced in the last 10-15 years.
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and a network of alumni, experts, and senior professors at top universi-
ties and foundations in the United States and abroad. By contrast, do-
mestic United States industries, labor, or agricultural interests that
resisted "free trade" were typically dismissed as narrow, special pleaders,
and not deserving by the free-trade and MNC outlooks. Third, espe-
cially from the later 1950s onward, the United States leadership estab-
lishment developed an ideological affinity for free trade and hands-off,
untrammeled world-market competition. To be sure, these American at-
titudes were fairly recent, and tariff protectionism had been a strong
theme of earlier United States foreign economic policies, from Alexander
Hamilton through the Whigs and the Republican ascendancy (1860-
1932). The Roosevelt-Truman administrations (1933-52) edged only
slowly and cautiously into freer trade. But during the Eisenhower ad-
ministration Republicans shifted fundamentally toward freer trade, using
the slogan of "trade not aid" as a cheaper way to strengthen a free world,
anti-Communist alliance. In addition, Americans naturally tended to
favor a framework of open market rules, like the United States internal
marketplace that resisted detailed supervision or collaboration with gov-
ernments (such as the Japanese, Korean, Swedish, or French-style "col-
laborative" industrial policies).
Thus, post World War II American ideology, MNCs, and foreign pol-
icy establishments perpetuated faith in a strongly free-trade-oriented
United States interpretation of GATT rights and remedies, along with
United States international trade laws. These outlooks became institu-
tionalized in the Office of the United States Trade Representative-part
of the elite White House staff directly linked to the President, which
dominated United States trade bargaining with other countries.' 5
C. Growing Importance of Regionalism and the European Community
Tensions between multilateral freer trade and regional economic
blocks emerged early in the post-World War II era. But European unity
was so desirable in the Cold War, as a military-political offset to the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its COMECON block of East
European satellites, that Western regional arrangements were en-
couraged by the United States and soon implemented by the Europeans.
The European Economic Community, created by the Treaty of Rome
(1958), followed broader but more limited arrangements, the OEEC for
economic recovery and cooperation (later the OECD), and the NATO
15. The U.S. Trade Representative's staff and alumni became the dominant source of
U.S. trade negotiating leadership, with an increasingly protective outlook of pro-GATT,
and rather anti-U.S. industrial policy outlooks. The U.S. Trade Representative's staff
developed strong biases in favor of MNCs, in spite of an increasing accumulation of criti-
cism from outside commentators. See generally Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade
Policy, supra note 2 (citing various sources that critique this approach to trade policy).
Views of the Economic Policy Institute, the Economic Strategy Institute, U.S. Business
and Industrial Council, and the AFL-CIO were never seriously considered by the U.S.
Trade Representative.
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military alliance, which included the United States and Canada. Later
the OECD grew to include Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. But the
European Economic Community, later the European Community
("EC"), became increasingly important and successful, going well be-
yond a free-trade area. The EC enlarged and transformed itself into a
quasi-federation of twelve nations with a strong bureaucracy, the Euro-
pean Commission, extensive regulation, substantial tax revenues, and
subsidy programs. 6 Its great economic success, overall prosperity, and
substantial political stability made the EC attractive to additional mem-
bers, as most of the outer seven (EFTA block), Turkey, and more re-
cently, Eastern Europe and parts of the former USSR expressed interest
in joining the EC. And the EC made special trade arrangements and
concessions with many of these "candidates" for future admission, along
with Moslem states in the Mediterranean area, and many former Euro-
pean colonies (Lom6 Convention states) in Africa, the Americas, and
parts of Asia. Despite the bickering in the ratification process, the Maas-
tricht-Europe 1992 arrangements for close economic integration and mu-
tual harmonization of laws and regulation have deepened the EC's
cohesion.7 In economic scale, political clout, and overall momentum
the EC is the strongest and most powerful economic block in the world
today.
The EC has become a tough trade bargainer, insisting, for example,
upon only modest concessions in weakening its Common Agricultural
Policy farm subsidy and export-promotion programs. The EC imple-
ments faster track anti-dumping and VRAs, and it has not allowed sig-
nificant trade deficits to develop with East Asia or other parts of the
world (in contrast to United States laxity on trade deficits). This ap-
proach is to their credit, of course, and reflects good sense."8 The EC's
federal character (led by French and German collaboration on many is-
sues) has given them solid coherence and reasonably predictable policies.
16. For recent EC developments see Charles R. Bean, Economic and Monetary
Union in Europe, 6 Jrl. of Econ. Perspectives 31-52 (1992); Richard Owen & Michael
Dynes, The Times Guide to 1992: Britain in a Europe Without Frontiers: A Comprehen-
sive Handbook (1989).
17. Among Europeans there also is a conflict between those seeking to widen Europe
with broader, if looser membership and those preferring to deepen Europe with less
widening, or at least a slower, more cautious expansion.
18. For recent summaries of the EC position with respect to agricultural subsidies,
see Agriculture-Collapse of Uruguay Round Talks Shows Unity of U.S. Farm-Business
Interests, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), Jan. 9, 1991, at 49; GA77 U.S. EC Again Fail to
Settle Farm Dispute But Pledge GATT Accord by End of this Year, Int'l Trade Rpt.
(BNA), Sept. 29, 1993, at 1604; Steven A. Holmes, Despite Farm Pact France Still Talks
Tough on Trade, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1993, at D2; Julie Wolf, EC Ministers Favor Fur-
ther U.S. Talks on Farm Accord, Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1993, at A19; Keith Bradsher,
Farm Subsidies Still Threaten GATT Talks, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1993, at Dl. The EC
position on dumping prefers informal, prompt settlement and relief through price under-
takings, findings of no injury are rare, and the investigations and procedures are more
informal and rapid. See John H. Jackson & William J. Davey, International Economic
Relations 718-19 (2d ed. 1986).
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Many observers now predict, however, that the EC will become some-
what less open to outside economic and corporate interests, as its voting
majority of states has to concern itself with maintaining reasonably full
employment, expensive social welfare obligations, and internal cohesion.
Although much of Eastern Europe and portions of the Commonwealth
of Independent States ("CIS") expressed eagerness to affiliate with or join
the EC, a majority of current EC members wants to go slowly on admit-
ting new members. This reflects an EC preoccupation with digesting and
implementing the Maastricht 1992 reform agenda and to avoid destabi-
lizing an already uneasy EC membership with further and divisive con-
troversies over which new members should be admitted, and in what
order. The EC seems to prefer generous access for trade-linked affiliates,
rather than significant new membership.' 9
Meanwhile, Mexico and the rest of Latin America greatly transformed
their attitudes during the later 1980s and early 1990s.2 0 Observing the
surge of industrial growth and per capita incomes in East Asia, and the
economic failures of Communist regimes in Russia, Eastern Europe,
Cuba, and Nicaragua, Latin Americans saw that market-oriented, ex-
port-led economic development strategies outperformed the inward-look-
ing, statist, and import-substitution models that had been fashionable in
Latin America for a generation. The Reagan-Bush administration, eager
to capitalize on freer market, conservative allies, welcomed this new
mentality. Bilateral investment treaties followed with many states, and
the Caribbean Basin Initiative was expanded into the Enterprise for the
Americas program. And, most recently, President Bush and President
Salinas of Mexico built upon the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement (1986-88), and they negotiated with Prime Minister Mulro-
ney of Canada the North American Free Trade Agreement (1989-92).
President Clinton accepted NAFTA in principle during the 1992 election
campaign, subject only to the need for side agreements on environmental
protection, worker rights, and import surges. Although the content and
adequacy of these side agreements remained controversial in the fall of
1993, the basic goal of improved and expanded-though balanced-
trade with Mexico and Latin America was not in much dispute. The
problem was how to achieve, if at all, reasonable balance and supervision
of these trade and investment flows.
19. With all the recent anxieties over the Maastricht ratification process, which con-
sumed 18 months of serious uncertainties and political bickering (Spring 1992 through
Fall 1993), together with anguished and demoralizing debates over the break up of Yugo-
slavia and Bosnia, Europe retreated from its brief euphoria over rapid EC expansion.
20. See generally Robert Bottome et al., In the Shadow of the Debt: Emerging Issues
in Latin America (1992) (analyzing Latin American debt in the late 1980s and early
1990s); Robert Devlin, Debt and Crisis in Latin America: The Supply Side of the Story
(1989) (analyzing Latin American debt in the late 1980s); The Latin American Develop-
ment Debate: Neostructuralism, Neomonetarism, and Adjustment Processes (Patricio
Meller ed., 1991) (discussing Latin American debt in the late 1980s and early 1990s);
Miguel Urrutia, Long-Term Trends in Latin American Economic Development, Inter-
American Development Bank (Miguel Urrutia ed., 1991).
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Other regional cooperation and integration agreements were becoming
more important, with an upsurge of efforts in the late 1980s to early
1990S.21 ASEAN, founded in 1975, has been fairly successful for South-
east Asian nations. MERCOSUR (1991) in South America looks prom-
ising, and more so than the earlier Andean Common Market (1969),
Central American Common Market (1961), or Latin American Free
Trade Area (1960). In Africa, the East African Economic Community
(1967) was an earlier effort, but more recently, the Economic Commu-
nity of West African States (1975), the Southern Development Coordina-
tion Conference (1980), and the Arab Maghreb Union (1988), have been
gaining some momentum. In the Caribbean the CARICOM (Caribbean
Common Market) was established in 1973, and reinforced by Reagan's
Caribbean Basin Initiative. Most recently, fifteen nations formed the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, including the United States, Japan,
China, Canada, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand,
Malaysia, Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.
Finally, with the break-up of COMECON and the USSR in 1989-91,
the CIS replaced most of the Soviet Union. Major economic linkages
and interdependence remained in the CIS, and this grouping could be-
come a quasi-federation comparable in some respects to the EC.'
Still other international groupings of nations have been important for
common-trade policies in the world market. The Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") became the outstanding example of
a commodity cartel, creating artificial scarcity and higher prices for its
members and other sizeable oil exporters, especially between 1973-85.'
More recently, the Cairns Group of agricultural exporting nations devel-
oped considerable clout, with joint bargaining, during later stages of the
Uruguay GATT round negotiations, particularly between 1987-93.4
In any event, the growing trend to regionalism, along with commodity
and sector arrangements across international lines, clearly makes it
harder to get multilateral agreements widely accepted. This reality is not
at all bad, however; it just means that changing "the rules for world
trade"-such as there are rules-is just rather more difficult. Properly
understood, this means that most nations still retain considerable leeway
21. See Franklin R. Root, International Trade and Investment, 562-75 (6th ed. 1990)
[hereinafter Root 6th ed.]; Root 7th ed., supra note 4, at 535; James Brooke, Latin
America's Regional Trade Boon, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1991, at DI; Secretary General
Says OAUIs Going Broke, J. of Com., Nov. 18, 1992, at 4A; Paula L. Green, High Tech
Investors Are Drawn to Tunisia, J. of Com., Feb. 20, 1992, at IA.
22. See Roger Cohen, Yeltsin Opposes Expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 2, 1993, at 4; Steven Greenhouse, Russia Will Formally Seek Full Status in
Trade Group, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1993, at D4.
23. Since 1931 at least 50 commodity cartels have been established, governing some
15 commodities, but only the oil, tin, cocoa, coffee, rubber, and sugar agreements were
somewhat successful, at least over a number of years. See Root 6th ed., supra note 21, at
541-59.
24. See Root 7th ed., supra note 4, at 207-09; Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-
Trade Policy, supra note 2, at 171-72.
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to employ serious industrial development policies, rejuvenation efforts,
and offsets to other countries' policies.25
II. CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF OVERALL TRADE BALANCES
A. Current-Accounts and Balance-of-Payments Discipline
For most nations, two high-priority economic goals are a healthy cur-
rent-account and reasonable balance-of-payments discipline.26 When
countries try to import significantly more than they export in goods and
services on a sustained basis, they weaken their creditworthiness; their
debt load increases; and the terms, conditions, and availability of further
borrowing become more onerous. Soon, their currencies depreciate. De-
valuation may make it harder to import excessively, as imports become
more expensive in stronger currencies. Exports could improve as they
become cheaper to foreigners, if the exported goods and services are of
good quality and competitive. But foreign exchange earnings increase
only if the net volume of exports grows enough to more than compensate
for a depreciated currency's decline in value. Another complication is
that foreign debt-service obligations must be satisfied in hard currencies,
so that devaluation increases the domestic currency burden of meeting
foreign obligations. Thus, debt overload countries often find that devalu-
ations alone do not help much in the short-run. 27 Instead, countries suf-
25. This certainly applies to the GATT (1947), and as further developed in the first
seven GATT Rounds (1947-79), which is the still governing arrangement for world trade.
See supra text accompanying notes 11-13. But with the Uruguay GATT Round agree-
ment, the asymmetry problem is aggravated seriously for the U.S., and we lose a lot of
this "safeguarding" leeway while other nations largely retain theirs. See supra notes 94-
110 and accompanying text.
26. See the following standard texts on international economics: Richard E. Caves &
Ronald W. Jones, World Trade and Payments, An Introduction 277-485 (3rd ed. 1981);
Paul R. Krugman & Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics, Theory and Policy 285-
592 (2d ed. 1991); Root 7th ed., supra note 4, at 462-508; John Williamson, The Open
Economy and the World Economy: A Textbook in International Economics 206-48
(1983).
However, competitiveness problems in a nation can certainly lead to recurrent strains
or balance-of-payments difficulties, and often successive devaluations (e.g., the extended
post-World War II economic difficulties of the U.K.). Many believe the U.S. has devel-
oped these sicknesses in the last 10-15 years, aggravated by weak industrial-trade policies
and serious asymmetry problems. See Robert A. Blecker, Beyond the Twin Deficits: A
Trade Strategy for the 1990s (1992); Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade Policy,
supra note 2, at nn.53-59 and accompanying text.
27. For special insights on the sufferings of debt-overload countries in the 1990s, see
Lovett, World Trade Rivalry, supra note 1, at 137-65; Carlos Marichal, A Century of
Debt Crises in Latin America: From Independence to the Great Depression, 1820-1930
(1989); Third World Debt: The Disaster that Didn't Happen, The Economist, Sept. 12,
1992, at 21. See generally Sue Branford & Bernardo Kuclinski, The Debt Squads: The
U.S., the Banks, and Latin America (1988); Benjamin J. Cohen, In Whose Interest? In-
ternational Banking and American Foreign Policy (1986); Darrell Delamaide, Debt
Shock: The Full Story of the World Debt Crisis (1984); Peter Korner et al., The IMF and
the Debt Crisis: A Guide to the Third World's Dilemma (Paul Knight trans. 1986);
Carlos G. Langoni, The Development Crisis: Blueprint for Change (1987); Philip A. Wel-
Ions, Passing the Buck: Banks, Governments, and Third World Debt (1987).
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fering with chronic balance-of-payments and debt-overload problems
usually need more comprehensive economic and fiscal reforms-cutting
back on excess budget deficits, reducing government programs, increas-
ing taxes, limiting inflation, losing jobs, reducing imports, expanding ex-
ports, and improving their overall international competitiveness. All this
requires painful "belt tightening," lowered incomes for many people, and
serious political strains which do not make the reform process any
easier.28
For all these reasons, successful countries in the post-World War II
era, such as Switzerland, West Germany, and Japan, place great empha-
sis upon a healthy balance-of-payments and current-account discipline.
They avoid trade deficits, insofar as possible, and try to achieve some
degree of current-account surplus over the years. Thus, solid trade sur-
pluses or at least balanced trade are an important sign of national eco-
nomic health, sound macro-economic management, and competitiveness.
World markets come to view nations that combine balanced trade or
trade surpluses with strong economic growth, increasing investment and
productivity, as solid performers in the world economy, deserving of re-
spect and worthy prospects for foreign investment.2 9
By contrast, nations that endure chronic or recurrent balance-of-pay-
ments difficulties, stagnation, or weak growth, are normally considered
poor performers.3" Typically, they suffer a lack of fiscal responsibility,
28. In the recent era between 1945 to 1971, under the Bretton Woods fixed dollar-
gold exchange standard, before floating exchange rates became widely established in
1973, pressures for devaluation would build up after successive balance-of-payments defi-
cits, and a more sudden "crisis" type devaluation would occur. This devaluation usually
followed months of increasingly rigid denials by government officials that any devalua-
tion was contemplated. For the pre-war gold standard era, the corrective mechanism for
balance-of-payments deficits involved substantial specie outflows, reduced bank lending,
tight credit conditions, and economic slump or depression. This action would cut im-
ports, might reduce wages, and cause economic disruption, unemployment and distress.
And devaluation of the local currency might be needed eventually, too, in terms of its
value in gold.
29. Since the late 1970s, this author has maintained a running series of national
macro-economic performance data on the leading industrial countries of the OECD, and
the more successful NICs and LDCs (with higher economic growth). This research led
to a comparative study of anti-inflation and stabilization policies. Broader research fol-
lowed into comparative industrial-trade policies, including a extended 1983 sabbatical in
Japan, together with various lectures, research, and teaching visits to Britain, France,
Germany, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Ireland, Greece, South Korea,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand, Philippines, Mainland China (People's Republic of
China), and Canada. In the course of that research William A. Lovett, World Trade
Rivalry: Trade Equity and Competing Industrial Policies (1987) was published. In re-
cent years this research has been extended with other articles, discussions, and studies
including a standard text, William A. Lovett, Banking & Financial Institutions Law: In
a Nutshell (1992). The criteria listed for successful national economic performance are
consensus standards used by most international economists and bankers throughout the
world today, especially in light of the 1970s inflation for many countries, and widespread
debt overload problems in the last fifteen years.
30. Such nations normally have been on the IMF's "sick list" for years, and are sub-ject to serious IMF "discipline" or conditionality for access to additional IMF-Paris Club
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excess budget deficits, internal inflation, and competitiveness problems.
In a rather stem way, national improvidence or underachievement is
punished economically, whereas successful nations, which achieve sound
teamwork, economic growth, and healthy current-account discipline or
surpluses tend to be rewarded economically with increased prosperity,
growing investment resources, and rising per capita incomes.
From this perspective, it is interesting to review United States eco-
nomic history. From 1789 to 1819, the early American republic had
mixed fortunes in the trade area, despite the federal government's bal-
anced budgets and the country's established credit-worthiness. The long
British-French conflict and wars between 1792-1815 brought uneven
trading opportunities for the Americans, with serious, intermittent dis-
ruptions. United States trade deficits followed briefly between 1815-19
and during the big foreign-investment boom of 1831-37. But otherwise,
despite substantial capital imports, an overall United States favorable
trade balance prevailed from the 1820s until the Civil War, reflecting a
strong period of sustained United States economic growth and expan-
sion. Although some trade deficits occurred briefly again in 1861, 1864,
1867, 1869, and 1872-73, the United States generally enjoyed respectable
trade surpluses from the 1870s all the way into the 1930s, another overall
period of sustained United States growth and economic expansion.
Trade deficits came briefly again in the depression years, 1933-40. But
United States trade surpluses resumed between 1941-67, through World
War II and the postwar economic boom. Although reasonable trade bal-
ance followed between 1968-75, United States trade deficits gradually be-
gan to accumulate between 1976-82 and became very large during the
last decade 1983-93. United States trade deficits totaled -$1,300 billion
since the early 1980s, with -$1,000 billion of current-account deficits
accumulated between 1983-93. Meanwhile, the United States lost its
large net-creditor position in 1982, which it had enjoyed since before
World War I, and soon became the world's largest debtor nation, with
-$750 billion in net external debt according to reasonable estimates by
credits to reschedule their external debts. Why has the U.S., however, been allowed "spe-
cial grace" during the last ten years, when serious fiscal deficits and external deficit
problems became more evident? The basic explanation is an aspect of the world's trade
asymmetry problem: for the U.S., its many allies, friends, and even adversaries there has
been a lagged appreciation of U.S. economic slowdown, relative recent stagnation, and
transformation from leading creditor to largest debtor nation. This lack in perception has
occurred because the U.S. emerged from World War II as the dominant free world indus-
trial, economic, and financial power. The U.S. played a successful role as leader of the
free world, and in developing the IMF, World Bank, and successive GATT Rounds.
Furthermore, the collapse of Communism between 1989-1991 accentuated respect for
U.S. achievement. It helped to mask widespread understanding of the real and dangerous
consequences for the U.S. of aggravated lack of fiscal indiscipline, and chronic trade and
current account deficits ($3,000 billion in budget deficits; $1,300 billion and almost
$1,000 billion, respectively, between 1981-93). Prospects for the mid to late 1990s are not
good with continued U.S. neglect of the twin deficits problem (i.e., budget and trading
deficits).
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1993.31 This recent performance is troubling for the United States econ-
omy to any sensible observer.
Meanwhile, it is helpful to compare United States commercial and
tariff policies with this overall record of United States trade and balance-
of-payments, which mostly involved trade balance or surpluses until re-
cent years.32 From the beginning of Alexander Hamilton's sound finan-
cial policies in 1789, and through most of subsequent United States
economic history, we imposed substantial tariffs on imports. It was not
until the post-World War II era that the United States began to lower its
tariffs substantially, especially after the late 1960s. During the first
twenty-five to thirty years after the war, the United States enjoyed special
advantages in competitiveness and productivity over most of its eco-
nomic rivals. Trade surpluses occurred through 1967, and reasonably
balanced trade continued into the mid-1970s. But from the late 1970s,
and even more since the early 1980s, United States external trade per-
formance (imports and exports) was squeezed between two forces: (i)
increasing and asymmetrical United States trade openness with minimal
response to foreign industrial policies, subsidies, restrictions, or discount-
ing, and (ii) increasingly powerful industrial challenges from Japan and
many NICs (Taiwan, Korea, and others). Many of these rivals used ag-
gressive industrial development policies, including export subsidy meas-
31. A "rough" estimate of the shifting capital position for the U.S. can be suggested
from accumulated current-account deficits. Thus, because the net creditor position of the
U.S. was estimated in 1980 to be around +S140 billion and the accumulated current-
account deficits between 1981-93 totaled at least -$1,000 billion as of end 1993, the U.S.
stands roughly -$850 billion in debt as of end 1993. Heavy net inflows of capital were
needed to offset heavy current account deficits. Between the years 1981-88, the U.S. net
position went from +S141 billion to -$532 billion-a swing of -$671 billion in a pe-
riod with -$798 billion current account deficits. If the same valuation estimates were
extended (based on largely historical costs), the net U.S. debtor position would have
reached at least -S800 billion by the end of 1993. Since June 1990, however, a different
valuation procedure, based more upon contrasting stock market indexes, has been uti-
lized by the Survey of Current Business. This new procedure yields a creditor position
for the U.S. of +$374 billion in 1981 versus -$521 billion in 1992. Either way, the U.S.
net international investment position has suffered a major deterioration between 1981-
192, anywhere from -$900 billion to -$950 billion, depending upon the valuation
procedure.
32. For general histories on tariffs, see Harold Underwood Faulkner, American Eco-
nomic History 224-39 (Rev. ed. 1931). See generally F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History
of the U.S. (8th ed. 1931).
We can summarize customs charged as a percentage of all free and dutiable imports as
follows: 1791-1815, averaging roughly 10 percent; 1816-20, 20-25 percent; 1820-32,
roughly 40 percent; 1833-43, 17-20 percent, 1844-56, 20-25 percent; 1857-61, 15-17 per-
cent; 1862-72, 35-40 percent; 1873-90, 30 percent; 1891-98, 20 percent; 1899-04, 27 per-
cent; 1905-12, 20-23 percent; 1913-20, 17 down to six percent; 1921-30, 13-14 percent;
1931-39, 15-17 percent; 1940-45, 10-12 percent; and 1947-70, only six to seven percent.
Thus, except for the brief Wilson era (especially 1916-20), and the post World War II era,
the U.S. generally charged tariff duties on imports averaging 10 percent, and often sub-
stantially more in the more protective periods. With respect to the tariffs charged on
dutiable imports, i.e., non-free items, the percentages imposed were considerably higher,
and more seriously protective.
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ures, significant formal and informal import restrictions, and widespread
discounting into United States markets.33 In retrospect, we should not
be surprised in the resultant large increases in United States imports and
serious difficulties in expanding United States exports. And, most unfor-
tunately, during the early 1980s the United States began to run very large
peacetime budget deficits, financed by heavy domestic and foreign bor-
rowing. Interest rates were kept up in the United States, which inhibited
productive investments in United States industries. This scenario helped
to allow foreign industries to grow faster than United States manufactur-
ing. With weakened international competitiveness, United States compa-
nies lost further ground in production, and new plant and equipment
investment. The United States neglected its underlying production-tech-
nology base, in contrast to the actions of a growing list of expanding
industrial rivals (Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Brazil, and other NICs). Fur-
ther, the EC as a whole did a better job of maintaining their industries
and avoiding excessive trade and current-account deficits.
B. Flawed United States Trade Bargaining and Weak Industrial
Policies in the Last 15-20 Years
With hindsight's wisdom we can see that the United States made a
sustained blunder of relying too long upon a largely unilateral free-trade
model, with asymmetrical openness and weak or minimal offsets to for-
eign industrial policies, subsidies, and discounting.34 The United States
did not need to accept large, chronic trade deficits. Certainly, Japan,
Germany, Switzerland, and other strong manufacturing exporters were
determined not to develop serious trade deficits, and they carefully main-
tained their overall competitiveness. The United States could have main-
tained comparable care and better self-discipline with less sacrifice of its
industrial markets and healthy economic growth."
1. The Nixon (Tokyo) GATT Round Trade Negotiations
The Nixon administration undertook the first efforts to correct the
asymmetry problem for world trade in the early 1970s. Attention fo-
33. For more recent U.S. trade history, increasing asymmetrical openness, and the
problems of competing industrial policies, see supra note 3.
34. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
35. Although "early warning" signs of U.S. competitive distress were developing in
the 1970s, especially for the U.S. electronics, steel, and automobile industries, the overall
U.S. trade, service, and current-account data only began to reveal serious deficits in the
early to mid 1980s. The U.S. was preoccupied, from the later 1960s and on into the
1970s by its role as military-political leader of the free world: the Vietnam War (1965-75);
Watergate (1973-1974); OPEC I and H (1973-80); Cold War tensions; and efforts at
detente and arms control dominated the attention of U.S. administrations from Truman,
Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and even Reagan-Bush.
But if U.S. leaders had focused as strongly on their economic-industrial-trade chal-
lenges as did the Japanese, West German, and Swiss establishments, the U.S. economy
could have been substantially more successful in the last 10-15 years. For realistic projec-
tions, see supra note 14.
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cused mainly upon Japan in the form of strong pressure from the United
States and Europe on Japan largely to eliminate that country's substan-
tially higher tariffs and import restrictions. The United States and Eu-
rope already had reduced their industrial product tariffs to low levels in
the Kennedy GATT Round (1962-67).16 Because the more successful
developing countries at that time (Mexico, Brazil, Taiwan, Yugoslavia,
Korea and others) were not yet seen as serious challengers in global in-
dustrial competition, a "double standard" of greater scope for LDC sub-
sidies, tariff restrictions, multiple exchange rates, and overall protection
still seemed reasonable. For all these reasons, the Tokyo GATT Round
results achieved by the Carter administration in 1979 seemed reasonable
at that stage.
In fact, most complaints about the Tokyo GATT Round came mainly
from LDCs, which had pushed for greater access to industrial-country
markets, commodity cartels like OPEC, and a better share of world in-
comes. MNCs were content with the Tokyo Round, because they had
succeeded in consolidating relative open-ness among the OECD indus-
trial nations, a major priority at this stage. Widespread hopes were ex-
pressed about a series of GATT Supplementary Codes-dealing with
Subsidies, Antidumping, Government Procurement, Customs Procedure,
etc., that might gradually reduce non-tariff barriers over the years.38
In the Tokyo Round, which the Carter administration finalized in
1979, Japan agreed to reduce tariffs to low United States and European
levels, so that apparent equivalence was achieved. But Japanese informal
restrictions, buying habits (mostly of Japanese manufactures), cartelistic
36. See generally Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT: Law and International Economic
Organization (1977); Dobson, supra note 32; John H. Jackson & William J. Davey, Legal
Problems of International Economic Relations (2d ed. 1986).
Unfortunately, during the Kennedy Round the U.S. had acquiesced in much more
protected agricultural markets for Europe and its Common Agricultural Policy.
Designed to protect the small, less efficient farms of Europe, the EC gradually enlarged
subsidies and began to subsidize increasing exports as well, which cut into the natural
agricultural export potential of the U.S.
37. For background on the Tokyo Round Negotiations, see Jackson & Davey, supra
note 36, at 325-31, 396-97, 409-17, 962-64, 1142-52. See generally Bruce E. Blubb, United
States Foreign Trade Law, Vol. I and 11 (1991); Sidney Golt, The GATT Negotiations,
1973-79: The Closing Stage (1978); Sidney Golt, The GATT Negotiations, 1973-75: A
Guide to the Issues (1974).
38. Many free-traders contended that these supplementary Codes could "discipline"
or limit the non-tariff barriers that might erode the gradual GATT accomplishment of
lowering tariffs between 1947-67. See authorities cited supra note 37. But a crippling
limitation of the GATT Supplementary Codes proved to be their limited list of signato-
ries who were mostly confined to the OECD club of advanced industrial nations. Only 24
countries signed the Subsidies Code, only 25 signed the Antidumping Code, only 39
signed the Standards Code, only 13 countries signed the Procurement Code, and only 29
signed the Customs Valuation Code. Thus, most of the "discipline" from these GATT
Supplementary Codes impacts industrial nations, and not the NICs or LDCs. The
toughest discipline has been self-inflicted by the U.S. against its own manufacturing inter-
ests. Despite its signature to each of these Codes, no other nation took these GATT
Codes all that seriously.
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marketing patterns, and MITI-style industrial-coordination expansion ef-
forts continued. 9 Actually, the Japanese export machine was just mov-
ing into high gear, with greater value machinery, ship-building, cameras,
musical instruments, automobiles, and more expensive electrical prod-
ucts receiving priority over lower-value consumer goods and textiles.
But big increases in world energy and food prices in the 1970s (including
OPEC I and II) put heavy strain on many countries' balance-of-pay-
ments, including Japan, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Italy, France,
and most non-oil LDCs. Meanwhile, the United States remained a large
food exporter, and it imported only half of its oil needs. Thus, the
United States suffered less balance-of-payments strain, and it continued
to enjoy favorable overall trade balance in the 1970s.40
In retrospect, however, the GATT Supplementary Codes failed to cor-
rect the asymmetry problem, particularly from the United States view-
point. Mainly industrial countries, not many NICs or LDCs, signed
most new codes, and these codes were relatively weak and aspirational in
language.4" In fact, the main impact on United States trade policy was to
lull Americans into false confidence. Further, the United States weak-
ened the prospects for countervailing duty for subsidy and dumping ac-
tions under United States trade law. But, in the late 1970s, Americans
were mainly preoccupied with surging inflation, OPEC II oil price in-
creases, the wage-price spiral, and income-tax-bracket creep. Although
foreign-manufactured imports were increasing, which revealed possible
United States competitiveness problems, Reagan's successful political
campaign focused on inflation and increasing tax loads.42
39. Japan continues to employ more subtle measures to limit manufactured imports
(social cohesion, cultural loyalties, language, marketing customs, administrative gui-
dance), and continues to stress efficient, quality manufactures, and the need for strong
export growth and volume. Japan has become the largest, chronic trade surplus nation
since the early 1980s, which is the same period in which the U.S. became a sustained and
excessive trade deficit country. See generally Thomas K. McCraw, America versus Japan
(1986) (discussing the public policy-making for business in America and Japan);
Prestowitz, supra note 2; Thurow, supra note 2; Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of
Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation (1989) (discussing Japan's rela-
tionships with the United States and Europe in the late 1980s). Needless to say, these
comments are not "Japan bashing;" quite the contrary, the U.S. must learn to emulate
the more productive features of Japanese culture, cohesion, and responsible government-
industry teamwork.
40. It is an interesting irony of history that over-crowded, heavily industrialized Ja-
pan, West Germany, and Switzerland were all harder hit by feed-grains, meat, and oil
price inflation in the 1973-75 period, but these special strains just stimulated these coun-
tries to even stronger export success, and much more rapid anti-inflation discipline in the
mid to late 1970s. Unfortunately, the U.S. produced a large food surplus and most of its
own energy.
41. See authorities cited supra note 39.
42. Interestingly, late in the Carter administration, officials considered an industrial
policy effort for their second term, along with a stronger anti-inflation policy. Such pos-
sibilities were pre-empted, however, by Reagan's victory in 1980. For late Carter-era
industrial policy thinking see Lovett, World Trade Rivalry, supra note 1, ch. 2 n. 11.
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2. Reagan-Bush Era Trade Policies
The Reagan administration's initial economic efforts concentrated
upon large income tax cuts, increased defense outlays, and widespread
deregulation. Tight federal monetary policies continued under Volcker,
supported by measures to weaken unions and limit wage pressures. Infla-
tionary momentum was largely halted, with a big recession in 1981-82, in
which unemployment nearly reached eleven percent. But, a strong re-
covery came in 1983-84, with inflation staying down. Unfortunately,
budget deficits rapidly increased, too, and interest rates were kept up to
contain inflation. All this brought a substantial appreciation of the dol-
lar, and a big import surge, together with stalled United States exports.
United States trade deficits greatly increased in 1983-87, followed by rec-
ord current-account deficits.43
United States trade policy in the Reagan era developed more slowly on
two tracks.' The primary theme was protecting and extending the free-
trade regime enjoyed by MNCs and favored by major United States
banking interests. A secondary theme was somewhat stronger trade bar-
gaining, with proposals by Commerce Secretary Baldridge for a new De-
partment of Trade and Industry ("DITI"), a weaker version of Japan's
MITI. But the USTR and MNC interests resisted the DITI, wanting
strict control of United States trade policies to remain in the hands of the
USTR staff, which was considered more reliably pro-free-trade and pro-
tective of MNC interests.
Early efforts toward another GATT Round focused on opening mar-
kets for services among developing nations, and, perhaps, some further
reductions in NTBs.45 But there was not enough consensus initially be-
tween the advanced industrial countries, NICs, and LDCs. A greater
pre-occupation between 1982-84 was the Latin American-LDC debt
overload emergency, which mobilized the IMF, leading central banks of
the creditor nations, and most large multinational banks into successful,
longer-term debt rescheduling operations." Walter Mondale cam-
paigned for President in 1984 against excessive budget deficits and grow-
ing trade deficits, and he warned against import pressures toward lower
United States wages. But Mondale's offer to raise taxes was unpopular,
43. See William A. Lovett, Banking and Financial Institutions Law ch. 2 (3rd ed.
1992); Lovett, World Trade Rivalry, supra note 1, cbs. 1, 6; Wallace C. Peterson & Paul
S. Estenson, Income, Employment, & Economic Growth 546-602, 626-86, 745-49, 769-
94 (7th ed. 1992). See generally Paul Volcker, Changing Fortunes: The World's Money
and the Threat to America's Leadership (1992).
44. See Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade Policy, supra note 2, at 167-73,
nn.62-66 & 68.
45. See generally Seymour J. Rubin & Thomas R. Grahan, Managing Trade Rela-
tions in the 1980's: Issues Involved in the GAT Ministerial Meeting 982 (1984). An
important theme developed, which later became known as the bicycle theory, that further
GATT round negotiations were crucial in order for free-trade and MNC interests to
preempt and maintain dominance over the international trade agenda.
46. See Lovett, World Trade Rivalry, supra note 1, ch. 4. See generally Volcker,
supra note 43.
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and successfully rejected by Reagan. With a strong economic recovery
underway in 1984, supported by a large inflow of foreign investments and
lending, Reagan was able to beat Mondale badly in the 1984 election
landslide.47
After Reagan's re-election, James Baker became Treasury Secretary,
and American international economic policy crystalized into two major
efforts.4" First, the Plaza Agreement brought a realignment of major ex-
change rates, with the yen and leading European currencies appreciating
substantially, and the dollar being substantially devalued. It was hoped
this realignment would eliminate United States trade-deficit problems.
Second, another GATT Round negotiation was launched in 1985 at
Punta del Este, Uruguay. Orchestrated by the former Agriculture Secre-
tary, Clayton Yeuter as United States Trade Representative, the Uru-
guay GATT Round emphasized market opening and freer-trade
measures in services along with goods, and it tried to achieve major re-
ductions in agricultural subsidies and protections. This approach would
greatly improve United States and Cairns group agricultural export pros-
pects, and would reduce the share of world output from smaller, less
efficient European and Japanese farms. This agenda proved politically
difficult, however, in many countries, and the GATT negotiating pro-
gress was slow and uneven.
Meanwhile, however, during the 1980s support began to build for an
alternative United States international economic policy. 49 Common
themes in the new outlook were an emphasis on the asymmetry problem,
47. See Lovett, World Trade Rivalry, supra note 1, at 190-201, 208-12. Mondale
attempted to raise the issue of excessive deficit spending, a need for greater fiscal responsi-
bility, and weakened competitiveness. But the 1983-84 recovery seemed strong, inflation
was nearly halted, and Reagan gave a brilliant political iposte to Mondale's demand for a
tax increase. Reagan remarked that the first thing Democrats wanted was a tax increase,
but that was the last thing Reagan wanted. See generally Jack W. Germond & Jules
Witcover, Wake Us Up When Its Over: Presidential Politics of 1984 (1985).
48. With respect to the Plaza Agreement of 1985 and subsequent efforts to realign
exchange rates, see generally Volcker, supra note 44; Wendy Dobson, Economic Policy
Coordination: Requiem or Prologue?, Inst. for Int'l. Econ. (1991); Roichi Funabashi,
Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre, Inst. for Int'l Econ. (1989).
For background and early outlooks on the Uruguay GATT Round, see generally John
Whalley, The Uruguay Round and Beyond, Final Report from the Ford Foundation
Project on Developing Countries and the Global Trading System (1989).
49. Highlights in this literature included Industrial Policies for Growth and Competi-
tiveness: An Economic Perspective (F. Gerard Abrams Lawrence R. Klein ed., 1983);
Stephen S. Cohen & John Zysman, Manufacturing Matters: The Myth of the Post-Indus-
trial Economy (1987); John Culbertson, International Trade and the Future of the West
(1984); John M. Culbertson, The Dangers of "Free Trade" (1985); Anthony Harrigan &
William R. Hawkins, American Economic Pre-Eminence: Goals for the 1990's (1989);
Chikara Higashi, Japanese Trade Policy Formulation (1983); Milton Hochmuth with
William Davidson, Revitalizing American Industry: Lessons from Our Competitors
(1985); Alexis Jacquemin, European Industry: Public Policy and Corporate Strategy
(Alexis Jacquemin ed., 1984); The Institute for Contemporary Studies, The Industrial
Policy Debate (Chalmers Johnson ed., 1984); William A. Lovett, World Trade Rivalry:
Trade Equity and Competing Industrial Policies (1987); Kevin Phillips, Staying on Top:
The Business Case for a National Industrial Policy (1984); David B. Yoffie, Power &
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and that Japan, many NICs and LDCs were actively using government
subsidies, restrictions, and coordination-along with lower wages-to
expand their industrial and agricultural output at the expense of Ameri-
can, British, and other open-country manufacturing industries. While
some realignment of industrial location and equalization of per capita
incomes were to be expected from freer world trade, the United States
and United Kingdom were losing more ground than they should have.
Their mutual mistake was to be unequally open. A tougher, reciprocity-
oriented trade policy was needed, along with more industrial rejuvena-
tion efforts, perhaps MITI-style, with better collaboration between gov-
ernment and industry. 0
This outlook gathered some strength in the mid-1980s, and it led to
repeated congressional efforts to enact stronger omnibus trade legisla-
tion." Yet, resistance from free-traders, MNC interests, and the Reagan
administration prevented significant changes. Representative Richard
Gephardt's proposal for a mandated reduction in Japanese trade sur-
pluses was watered down into so-called "Super 301," which merely re-
quires annual trade-restriction reports on trade partners and allows
somewhat stronger presidential responses to foreign government discrim-
ination or unfair practices. Although the Democrats could have aggres-
sively attacked record high United States trade and current-account
deficits in the 1988 presidential campaign, their nominee Massachusetts
Governor Michael Dukakis was free-trade oriented. He chose not to
raise these issues substantially, and proved to be a weak opponent against
incumbent George Bush. 2 Many wondered whether New York Gover-
nor Mario Cuomo could have been a tougher Democratic candidate,
with a stronger trade-industrial policy outlook.
After the election, Bush emphasized free-trade policies, even more
than Reagan's administration. 3 The new USTR, Carla Hills, moved for-
ward on the GATT negotiations, and was less demanding on agriculture.
Meanwhile, Bush built on the United States-Canada free-trade agree-
Protectionism: Strategies of the Newly Industrializing Countries (1983); Otto Eckstein, et
al., The DRI Report on U.S. Manufacturing Industries (1984).
50. See sources cited supra note 49.
51. Between 1984-88 there were repeated efforts in the U.S. House of Representatives,
joined later by the Senate in 1987-88, to develop an Omnibus Trade bill that would
strengthen U.S. industry and competitiveness in world markets. A highlight of the effort
was an amendment offered by Congressman Richard Gephardt of Missouri that would
have mandated fifteen percent annual reductions in the Japanese-U.S. trade surplus, un-
less the President found that U.S. sanctions under § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 were
inappropriate-a relatively weak, easily avoided requirement.
52. Governor Dukakis could have mounted a strong and coherent attack on the twin
deficits issue, with record budget deficits at five percent of GNP, and record trade deficits
at four percent of GNP, but he was uneasy on the economy, and overconfident. Instead,
he stressed foreign policy and increased health care spending instead. See Jack Germond
& Jules Witcover, Whose Broad Stripes and Bright Stars? The Trivial Pursuit of the
Presidency (1989). It remained for Bill Clinton and Ross Perot to mount the coherent
attack in 1992.
53. See Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade Policy, supra note 2, at 169-73.
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ment, and Mexico's new willingness for more open trade and United
States investment, to negotiate an expanded North American Free Trade
Agreement." The NAFTA deal was concluded by the fall of 1992. It
provided for further opening of the United States market to Mexico and
for a slower opening by Mexico, with more safeguards to Mexican com-
panies. The United States gained more investment opportunities, and
could expand lower wage manufacturing activities (already substantial
under the Maquiladora program) in Mexico. In the United States, con-
troversy developed over the probability that jobs would be lost. Further
negotiations in the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative looked toward
freer trade with a growing list of other Latin American and Caribbean
countries, patterned after the NAFTA deal, when approved by Con-
gress." And with respect to the Uruguay Round, although the initial
deadline of December, 1990 proved unworkable, a near complete
"Dunkel draft" GATT agreement was worked out in December 1992,
along with a Blair House Accord on agriculture in which the EC prom-
ised to cut major agricultural export subsidies by twenty-one percent
over six years.56 If Bush had been re-elected in November 1992, he
planned to seek prompt ratification for both deals early in 1993, relying
upon the re-election mandate as the basis for Congressional support.
3. The Clinton Era: An Opportunity for Stronger United States
Industrial-Trade Policies?
Challengers Bill Clinton and Ross Perot campaigned strongly against
Bush economic and trade policies, with somewhat different emphases,
and together won sixty-two percent of the popular vote." Clinton em-
phasized the importance of more jobs, attacked "trickle down" econom-
ics, and demanded fairer trade. Perot feared a "giant sucking sound" of
54. See generally The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, The Global Im-
pact (Jeff Schott & Murray Smith eds., 1988); Gary C. Hufauer & Jeffrey Schott, North
American Free Trade: Issues and Recommendations (1992); Perspectives On a U.S.-Ca-
nadian Free Trade Agreement (Robert M. Stern et al. eds., 1987); The United States and
Canada: The Quest for Free Trade-An Examination of Selected Issues (Paul Wonnacot
ed., 1987); Sidney Weintraub, Free Trade Between Mexico and the U.S.? (1984).
55. Enterprise for the Americas Initiative was developed by the Bush administration
as a supplement to NAFTA, in which many countries would be welcomed to "follow on"
with similar arrangements. This makes the detailed terms and conditions of NAFTA and
the Clinton Side Agreements very influential as a pattern for many other nations in the
hemisphere that would be eager to join and share in such an expanding trade block.
56. See Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade Policy, supra note 2, at 171-72;
Root 7th ed., supra note 4, at 207-09.
57. See Governor Bill Clinton & Senator Al Gore, Putting People First 75-80, 143-
45, 155-60 (1992); Ross Perot, United We Stand 57-72, 99-102 (1992); The Cuomo Com-
mission on Competitiveness, America's Agenda: Rebuilding Economic Strength 92-123,
200-05 (Lee Smith ed., 1992); Kevin Phillips, Boiling Point: Republicans, Democrats,
and the Decline of Middle-Class Prosperity 195-222, 249-59 (1993); Rethinking
America's Security: Beyond the Cold War to New World Order 117-175 (Graham Al-
lison & Gregory Treverton eds., 1992). See generally Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The
Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America (1992).
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jobs moving South, demanded fiscal responsibility, and argued that re-
building our industrial base was a necessity. Bush had highlighted free-
trade and global markets, and claimed that his policies were sound.
Sluggish and weak United States economic growth and stubborn unem-
ployment in many areas, however, eroded public confidence. Many Rea-
gan Democrats turned against the Republicans, and the voters clearly
endorsed new policies and "change" in some degree.
But what mandate on industrial-trade policy seemed to follow? In
Clinton's first months as President, an internal struggle raged within
high levels of the administration between free-traders and stronger trade-
industrial policy advocates.58 Democrats in Congress sharply divided be-
tween pro-NAFTA, internationalist elements, and those who desired an
improved NAFTA, a better GATT deal, and more reciprocity and sup-
port for United States industry and jobs. While more Republicans fa-
vored freer trade, Perot and Pat Buchanan had stoutly criticized Bush on
NAFTA and trade policy.
Later, Clinton seemed to move in the free-trade direction. During the
summer, Clinton's negotiators worked out relatively weak Side Agree-
ments for Environmental Protection, Worker Rights and Import
Surges.59 Most labor groups and substantial parts of the environmental
community continued to oppose NAFTA. Free-trade lobbyists were en-
couraged by Clinton's endorsement for NAFTA and a GATT Round
agreement. In contrast, Democrats remained deeply and emotionally di-
vided over trade policy issues, and many observers wondered how far
Congress and the Clinton administration would go together." Free-trad-
ers worried that Clinton's support might be limited, and not enough to
force their agenda through Congress.
Meanwhile, the tentative Dunkel draft-Blair House deal on the Uru-
58. See Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade Policy, supra note 2, at 173-77
nn.74-85.
59. See Keith Bradsher, The Free-Trade Accord; 3 Nations Resolve Issues Holding Up
Trade Pact Vote, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1993, at 1; North American Free Trade Agreement
Side Accord on Environment and North American Free Trade Agreement Side Accords on
Labor and Import Surges, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1536-58 (Sept. 15, 1993) [herein-
after Side Accords]; Trade-NAFTA Side Deal All But Done Focus Shifts to Congress,
Cong. Q. Wdy., Aug. 4, 1993, at 2219; Presidential Address: Clinton Urges Passage of
Free-Trade Pact, 37 Cong. Q., No. 37, Sept. 18, 1993, at 2501-02 [hereinafter Presidential
Address]; American Survey: Viva NAFTA, The Economist, Aug. 21st, 1993, at 21-22.
60. Highlights in the political fight over NAFTA included: Michael Lind, Reaga-
nomics, With a Mexican Accent, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1993, at A31; William Schneider,
NAFTA Has the White House Spooked, Natl J., Aug. 21, 1993, at 2112; Fred Barnes,
White House Watch-Better Late, New Republic, Oct. 4, 1993, at 12; Jackie Calmes,
Gephardt States His Opposition to Trade Pact, Wall St. J. Sept. 22, 1993, at A2; David E.
Rosenbaum, Democratic Split Over Trade Agreement Widens, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1993,
at Al; Peter T. Kilborn, Unions Gird for War Over Trade Pact, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1993,
at A4; TRBfrom Washington, Trading Places, New Republic, Oct. 4, 1993, at 6; Clifford
Krauss, Washington Talk. In Finagling on Trade Pact, Legislators' the Barter Is the Votes,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1993, at B10; Keith Bradsher, Clinton and Congress Discuss 3-Year
Test of the Trade Pact, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1993, at 9; Tim Golden, Trade Pact Passage
May Hinge on Mexican Sugar, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1993, at A3.
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guay GATT Round remained controversial. 6 ' A more conservative
French government under Balladur seemed determined to renegotiate
the Blair House commitments, i.e., to reduce EC agricultural export sub-
sidies by twenty-one percent over six years. But Mickey Kantor, Clin-
ton's USTR, refused to renegotiate. This left the EC's trade negotiator to
seek reasonable "clarification and understandings." This apparent im-
passe might have been sufficient to block or delay a Uruguay GATT
Round deal. In Congress, there was less support and understanding for
the Dunkel draft than NAFTA, and most observers felt that NAFTA
would be a close vote either way.
But what really was the Clinton industrial-trade policy agenda? What
should it have been? In a post-Cold War era, a more comprehensive
rethinking of United States industrial-trade policy seemed appropriate.62
But what should be the main objectives of United States trade policy
now? Clearly the Clinton administration was mobilizing a great effort to
reform the overly expensive, wasteful, and incomplete coverage of the
United States health care system. And eight months of hard work and
struggle was needed to fashion a preliminary 1993 budget-tax-deficit re-
duction deal. By single votes in the House and Senate a sizeable tax
increase, mainly imposed on the well-to-do, was enacted; but many be-
lieve that still more deficit reduction is needed between the years 1994-
2000, and that further discipline on entitlements will be essential. In this
context, there is a real danger that the administration could make key
United States industrial-trade policy decisions with less than careful re-
view, over-shadowed by larger battles over budget priorities, tax loads,
and health care reform. Lacking in the national debates over NAFTA,
and with little attention or understanding of the GATT (1994), is a seri-
ous reconsideration of national goals, long-term interests, and coherence
for United States trade and industrial policy. What follows is an attempt
to provide that perspective and a guideline for American trade and in-
dustrial policy overhaul.63
61. See Highlights-The Blair House Dispute is Unresolved After a Meeting Between
US. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor and the European Community's Chief Trade
Negotiator, Sir Leon Brittan, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1601, 1604 (Sept. 29, 1993).
62. See Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade Policy, supra note 2, at 173-84.
63. President Clinton's administration is giving high priority, with great attention for
detail, to redesigning the health care "system," and bringing more effective cost disci-
pline. Great effort also has been given to U.S. budget, tax, and deficit reduction. By
constrst, the President has devoted less time to U.S. industrial-trade policy, particularly
the details of the NAFTA agreement inherited from the Bush administration, and the
Dunkel draft Uruguay GATT Round agreement nearly completed in December, 1992, by
the Bush administration, and later approved by GATT negotiators in December, 1993.
Certainly Clinton campaigned in 1992 on the urgency of rejuvenating the U.S. economy,
and the need to provide greatly expanded jobs and better incomes for Americans.
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III. REBALANCING ALTERNATIVES FOR UNITED STATES TRADE
POLICY
A. Realistic Goals for United States Policy
To formulate goals for United States trade policy in the 1990s we must
understand the overall context of the United States economy and the
serious challenges that face the Clinton administration. The basic Amer-
ican problem is that the country has been living beyond its means.' We
have been neglecting technology, capital formation, full employment,
and productivity needs. Significant waste of human and investment re-
sources has been occurring, with chronic under-employment, both in ur-
ban and rural areas. Social demoralization, family difficulties, drug
abuse, indiscipline, and excessive crime have spread. The Clinton-Perot
election campaigns of 1992 tried, with considerable success, to focus na-
tional attention on these issues. But, central to solving these problems is
a need to rejuvenate the American economy, restore higher levels of
growth, and re-establish fuller employment. Expanding jobs, achieving
greater efficiency, and renewing prosperity are top priorities.
Macro-economic policy, fiscal responsibility, health care overhaul, in-
dustrial rejuvenation, export expansion, and balanced trade should work
together6" and require steady United States progress toward deficit re-
duction. Gramm-Rudman in 1985 had the correct goal, i.e., eliminating
the $200 billion annual budget deficits gradually over four years. But
political gridlock from 1986-92 prevented Gramm-Rudman from suc-
cessful implementation, except for limited gains in the 1990 Bush-Demo-
cratic deficit reduction compromise. Most observers and financial
markets saw that Clinton's 1993 budget-tax package was helpful, but the
country would need more discipline in successive years.6 Clinton's
64. These goals were stated strongly by candidates Clinton, Gore, and Perot in 1992.
See sources cited supra note 57. And leading economists like Lester Thurow, supra note
57, analyzed these problems in great detail. Compare Lovett, World Trade Rivalry, supra
note 1, ch. 6; David P. Calleo, The Bankrupting of America: How the Federal Budget Is
Impoverishing the Nation (1992); Benjamin M. Friedman, Day of Reckoning: The Con-
sequences of American Economic Policy Under Reagan and After (1988).
65. All these things are needed together, and if done in tandem, reinforcing mutual
benefits follow. But, if the U.S. fails to eliminate excess budget deficits, and get health
care under prompt control, inflation and interest rates will rise, again, and undercut the
economic growth and increased jobs that are necessary. If manufacturing is not rejuve-
nated and we fail to eliminate current account deficits and needless trade deficits, we will
also fall to create the economic growth, increased jobs, and productivity that are needed
for broader prosperity. So the Clinton era needs to accomplish three things together: (1)
fix the budget and eliminate excess deficits; (2) bring health care under control and elimi-
nate its inflationary, excessive cost momentum; and (3) rejuvenate our productive econ-
omy (services alone are not enough), eliminate the trade and current account deficits, and
restore balanced trade.
66. The general reaction of money markets, most economists, the media, and foreign
observers was that President Clinton deserved great credit for launching a strong effort to
achieve major U.S. budget deficit reduction in the spring of 1993. This initiative required
a mix of tax reductions and spending cuts with the hope that these measures do not fall
too hard on the middle class. Most agreed that this was politically difficult. In the end,
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much-awaited health reform proposals simultaneously attempted to cut
waste, broaden coverage, and reduce health-spending growth.67 This re-
form will be tricky politically, but most agree its aspirations are sound.
Current outlays (fourteen percent of GDP) for health care are out of line
with other advanced countries. The United States is wasting significant
investment resources that could be more productively allocated to rejuve-
nating industry, improving technology, and expanding jobs. In these two
broad efforts fiscal responsibility and health care reform, the Clinton ad-
ministration could mobilize substantial consensus. The majority of the
public supports the overall objectives of greater fiscal responsibility and
health care efficiency, but skillful leadership is vital.
For United States industrial-trade policy there is incomplete consen-
sus, but a solid majority could be mobilized on several points.68 First,
more careful and detailed export and import reporting must be required
for all goods, services, and shipping activities involving United States in-
ternational trade. Second, the United States soon should eliminate its
overall trade and current-account deficits, and move firmly to eliminate
any substantial trading deficits with significant trade partners, except to
the extent that these deficits involve materials or equipment vital to na-
tional security. Third, the United States should comprehensively en-
courage enlarged exports of goods, services, and shipping, especially with
respect to countries or areas that have enjoyed trading surpluses with the
United States. Fourth, the United States, using the same policies used by
other countires, should encourage industrial rejuvenation in many manu-
facturing sectors, particularly those involving higher value-added activi-
ties. In addition, it should develop general encouragements for industrial
investment, research and development activities, worker training, re-
gional or urban recovery, and export growth through tax relief and as-
Clinton's deficit reduction package passed the House and Senate by only single votes.
And at the margin, significant regrets were expressed that Clinton's deficit reduction
package didn't go far enough, that it left too much of the cancer of excess spending uncut.
The need for broader sacrifice was only partly recognized in health care reform and that
was packaged as mostly an easy reduction of waste and paper work. See generally Peter
Peterson, Facing Up (1993).
67. This effort already is entangled in special interest politics, and some honest confu-
sion about controversial details. Most experts agree, however, that there is extensive du-
plication, very sizeable waste, and considerable unneeded health care provided, although
a substantial minority get insufficient health insurance coverage. The challenge is to
overhaul and organize things promptly enough, so that greatly increased health care costs
and premium charges can be avoided. See The Clinton Cure; Reinventing Health Care,
Newsweek, Oct. 4, 1993, at 36; Rashi Fein, A Dangerous Year, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28,
1993, at A27; J.D. Kleinke, The Health Care Inflation Fantasy, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1993,
at A 16; Uwe E. Reinhardt, A Billion Here, A Billion There, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1993, at
A17.
68. All the experts listed previously in supra note 49, and many others, could support
this entire agenda with the usual qualifications as to relative emphasis. Broad public
majority support also could be quickly mobilized, and was really implicit in the 62 per-
cent popular vote received by Clinton and Perot in the 1992 election. What is needed
now is to crystalize this consensus into serious, comprehensive, and programmatic action.
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sisted financing. Fifth, on a comprehensive, industry-wide basis, the
United States should develop offsets to foreign industrial policies, subsi-
dies, tax relief, restrictions, and discounting. Sixth, those United States
government agencies that have an impact on exports, imports, and trad-
ing balances should develop programs of collaboration and information-
sharing with United States industries and trade associations involved in
these fields. The United States government should work harmoniously
with American companies and industries to promote United States ex-
ports, production, and balanced trade with other countries. Healthy
United States national teamwork should be the watchword for a
stronger, more competitive American presence in world markets. Sev-
enth, with relatively few exceptions, government micro-management of
companies or industries has not worked well in the United States polit-
ical context. A smothering approach of heavy government regulation
will command little confidence in business or Congress.69
B. Rebalancing Options for United States Trade Policy
1. Tariffs for Revenue and Industrial Rejuvenation
A striking fact of United States economic history is that tariffs played
a major role in raising revenue and encouraging industrial development
through most of the nation's history.7" Until 1947, tariffs generally aver-
aged at least fifteen to twenty percent. Revenues from customs and ton-
nage taxes comprised a large portion of overall federal revenues until the
later 1930s, when income taxes became increasingly important as the ma-
jor revenue base. Tariffs provided market-oriented incentives for United
States manufacturing and industrial development. The government
needed no bureaucrats to identify, justify, or subsidize candidates or
projects for industrial expansion. Tariffs and early tonnage taxes did the
job generally and reliably. Long-term United States manufacturing and
industrial growth investments, along with industrial job growth, could
count on a steady cost advantage through traditional United States tariff
policy. Unquestionably, United States tariff policy was an active but gen-
eral industrial-growth and promotion effort.7"
69. Picking winners or losers in the American market-place has been difficult politi-
cally, at least as compared to more cohesive nations, in our large federal democracy,
except for a limited range of national defense, naval, merchant marine, aerospace, and/or
health care priorities at any given stage in U.S. history. The long-term U.S. industrial
success of moderate market-oriented tariffs, especially from 1815 until after World War
II, however, should not be forgotten. See generally Otis L. Graham, Losing Time: The
Industrial Policy Debate (1992); supra notes 2-36 and accompanying text.
70. See authorities cited supra note 32. In addition, for insights on the British trade
experience, see generally Michael Kitson & Solomos Solomou, Protectionism and Eco-
nomic Revival: The British Interwar Economy (1990); Keith Middlemas & John Barnes,
Baldwin: A Biography (1969); Charles L. Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 1918-40
(1955). More broadly, for comparative tariff-industrial development history, see Lovett,
World Trade Rivalry, supra note 1, ch. 1. And for a brief summary, see Lovett, Rethink-
ing US. Industrial-Trade Policy, supra note 2, at 136-40.
71. Most other countries used comparable tariff policies, except that Britain largely
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Today, the United States should revive moderate tariffs (in the ten to
fifteen percent range) for two reasons. 72 First, eliminating the excessive
United States budget deficit requires further cuts in spending and/or rev-
enue enhancement. A ten to fifteen percent revenue-oriented tariff would
generate $50-65 billion annually in additional revenues, and these levies
would be consumption taxes that would not be discouraging to United
States domestic investment, jobs, or productivity improvement. Second,
foreign imports into the United States have benefited from a generation
of asymmetrical openness, widespread foreign industrial policies, subsi-
dies, targeting, restrictions, and discounting that gradually weakened
United States manufacturing, industrial, and agricultural growth. Reve-
nue tariffs in the ten to fifteen percent range are reasonable, not an un-
duly burdensome offset in these circumstances, and are a healthy,
renewed incentive for United States rejuvenation. In key industries
where special damage, dislocation, or contraction can be traced to for-
eign imports, these rejuvenation tariffs could be raised to twenty to
twenty-five percent for a period of approximately ten years in order to
encourage substantial United States and foreign investments that would
rebuild and rejuvenate these damaged industries.
It should be emphasized that general-revenue tariffs are consistent
with GATT, i.e., they do not involve discrimination among countries.73
From this viewpoint a general tariff has advantages over a selective, un-
fair-trade-practice approach, which requires labeling various trade part-
ners or their companies as violating international or national law
standards of fair trade.
opened its home markets to foreign imports between the 1840s-1920s. This policy
worked well enough for Britain until the 1900s when strong U.S., German, and Japanese
rivals had caught-up with British industry. But the British began to worry more about
asymmetries in trade, until in 1931 they finally adopted Imperial Preference tariffs. See
generally Kitson & Solomou, supra note 70; Middlemas & Barnes, supra note 70.
72. Unfortunately, Clinton administration forecasts project that large U.S. budget
deficits still would remain in 1996, so that, no matter what happens to health care reform,
large deficit reduction measures will still be needed. In addition, consumption taxes arc
increasingly favored by economists over business income-payroll taxes, because improved
economic growth and more jobs will follow. See Thurow, supra note 2, at 268-71. See
generally Peterson, supra note 66; Sijbren Cnossen, Consumption Taxes and International
Competitiveness: The OECD Experience, 52 Tax Notes 1211 (1991). Finally, another ad-
vantage of moderate revenue tariffs is that they provide a much more reliable data base
for careful administration of U.S. unfair-trade-practice laws by the U.S. Commerce Dept.
and the U.S. International Trade Commission.
73. A central theme of GATT Article If (1957) is the principle of non-discrimination
in tariffs. A general revenue tariff is consistent with this governing theme. This might
encourage other GATT nations to provide comparable, but not higher, tariffs. Many
might worry that this could hurt developing countries, but NICs and many LDCs have
gained substantially in world markets as against the U.S. and EC over the last generation.
Furthermore, most developing nations still have the advantage of lower wage costs, so
that a moderate revenue tariff in the U.S. or EC would not greatly reduce their access to
these higher wage countries.
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2. Foreign-VAT Waiver Correctives
Another general measure that the United States could use is a value-
added tax ("VAT") waiver corrective. Unlike most industrial countries,
the United States does not employ a VAT, which is commonly ten,
twelve, or fifteen to twenty-two percent of the value added in the large
majority of industrial countries competing against the United States in
world markets. Nations that use the VAT generally exempt or rebate this
tax for their manufacturers that sell into the United States, which gives
them an advantage or "subsidy" to this extent for their exports into the
United States. This tax policy handicaps United States manufacturers
that have to withstand competition from abroad. The United States has
not, unfortunately, created a sufficient offset or corrective import tax to
combat this practice.7 4
Alternatively, the United States could charge a general VAT-waiver
offset of twelve to fifteen percent on imports from VAT countries. The
United States could impose a variable VAT waiver-corrective charge of
precisely the VAT amount waived by the EC, Germany, France, the
United Kingdom, Japan, Mexico, etc. Nonetheless, a general charge
probably makes more sense, because it is hard now to trace the percent-
age of foreign manufactures to particular countries. Some sensible offset
would be a helpful measure to level the playing field for world trade.
Alternatively, the United States could impose its own VAT in the
twelve to fifteen percent range."5 This tax would generate larger addi-
tional consumption tax revenues, but federal, state, and city governments
would have to share these revenues in some reasonable way. At present,
most United States states and many large cities employ sizeable retail
sales taxes, which are in fact more limited and truncated VATs. 6 A fair
compromise might split equally a federal VAT of twelve to fifteen percent
with state and local governments. But such a major change in United
States tax policy, with large net government revenue increases, would be
74. See Jackson & Davey, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, 784-
789 (2d ed. & Supp. 1986); Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade Policy, supra note 2,
at 158-59; Lovett, World Trade Rivalry, supra note 1, at 118-19.
75. See Thurow, supra note 2, at 268-71; Fritz Hollings, Here's A Great Tax, N.Y.
Times, February 15, 1993, at A16. Very interestingly, President Clinton suggested early
in his administration that a U.S. VAT may be required "not too long into the future."
Terrence Hunt, US. Sales Tax in the Future, New Orleans Times-Picayune, Feb. 20, 93,
at Al. Many conservatives would be worried, of course, that a U.S. VAT could be used
to prop up, and sustain overly generous health care and entitlement benefits, i.e., too
much welfare state activity. But a U.S. VAT could be enacted as part of a more general
tax restructuring, i.e., to reduce income and payroll taxes, increase consumption, and to
improve overall savings, investment, employment and growth.
76. General sales taxes are widely imposed on retail sales, with 45 states using them
at rates of three to seven and one-half percent. In addition, many cities have employed
sales taxes (including New York and New Orleans), which are usually collected with
state levies for convenience. See generally Hoffman F. Fuller, The Proposed Value-Added
Tax and the Question of Tax Reform, 34 Rutgers L. Rev. 50 (1981). Any VAT reform in
the U.S. must be meshed somehow and/or shared with state and local sales taxes, in
order to be realistic politically.
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controversial. Some would object to the regressive character of sales or
VAT taxes unless substantial food and drug exemptions are provided in
the VAT regime. A federal United States VAT of twelve to fifteen per-
cent would provide an equivalent corrective to foreign VAT waivers or
export subsidies. Excessive increases in United States tax revenues could
be offset by substantial reductions in United States corporate, personal,
or payroll taxes, which could improve savings and capital formation in-
centives, and help create more United States jobs. Although politically
controversial, a VAT for the United States makes a great deal of sense for
the long term.
3. Import Surcharges for Trade Imbalances
Another tool to enforce improved trade balances for the United States
would be import surcharges or quota restrictions authorized by GATT
Article XII (1947), or under section 122 of the United States Trade Act
of 1974.17 The United States used this tool before, when Nixon em-
ployed import surcharges to force major trading partners to realign their
currencies in 1971-73. Strictly speaking, Presidential emergency and war
powers authority was used for this purpose, which led later to an en-
abling act for import surcharges for serious balance-of-payments
problems: section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. At least from 1986 to
the present-a period in which the United States sustained large and ex-
cessive United States current-account and trade-imbalance problems-
the United States could have used import surcharges or quotas, suppos-
edly in a non-discriminatory manner.
A complication with this general approach is that imports from coop-
erative, i.e., balanced trade partners, might be reduced as much or more
as from heavy surplus trade partners. To the extent that blame and
sources of chronic overall trade imbalance can be traced to particular
trading partners, a selective response or treatment may be appropriate.78
4. GATT and United States Unfair Trade Practice Remedies
Use of unfair trade practice remedies has been rather limited in the
United States, at least in recent years. Broader interpretation and use of
77. Balance of payments emergencies quotas or surcharges are clearly authorized by
GATT Art. XII (1947) and the United States Trade Act § 122 (1974). The aggravated
United States current-account and trade deficits from 1985 to 1993, which show little
sign of abating, still justify balance of payments measures to limit excessive imports.
Lacking, however, has been the political will, and sufficient understanding of the linkages
between excessive imports, weakened U.S. industry, reduced jobs, and slowed economic
growth. Borrowing from world markets seemed relatively easy, and required no embar-
rassing political controversy over under-achievement in the U.S. economy. See the
growth in U.S. external debts, indicated supra note 32. See generally Lovett, World
Trade Rivalry, supra note 1; Thurow, supra note 2.
78. In 1985-89, a broad U.S. trade deficit was occurring with many trade partners,
but by 1991-93 it seems that most of the U.S. trade deficit problem is concentrated with
Japan, China, Taiwan, Canada, and Germany (and of these only Japan and Taiwan have
been earning large surpluses lately).
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these remedies, however, might help achieve sustained overall United
States trade balance. The chief unfair trade practice remedies authorized
by GATT Article VI (1947), and United States trade law are: actions for
countervailing duties against foreign subsidies of imports into the United
States, and actions against dumping by foreign companies into the
United States.79 Relief can be obtained when United States companies
make a strong showing that subsidies or price discrimination occurred,
and that substantial injury threatens the United States industries in-
volved. Burdens of proof for successful plaintiffs in recent years have
been demanding, with significant litigation expenses. Normally, a year
or more is involved before those injured can hope to get any serious re-
lief. In addition, private parties can seek relief under section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 against foreign government activities that significantly
discriminate against, threaten, or harm United States industries. Pros-
pects for relief are doubtful in most situations, and United States govern-
ment intervention to support United States companies is rare.
In recent years, the only private United States trade remedy with fairly
strong prospects is the section 337 proceeding for infringement of United
States domestic intellectual property rights: patents, trademark, or copy-
right interests."0 Otherwise, United States trade-law remedies have had
only minor impact in limiting imports and unfair trade practices.
For United States unfair-trade-practice remedies to become serious
constraints against imports into the United States, the federal govern-
ment must substantially relax burdens of proof. Thus, for example, the
government could make any kind of indirect subsidy by foreign govern-
ments, financial institutions, or conglomerate companies subject to coun-
tervailing duty proceedings. Requirements for tracing injury in either
subsidy or dumping situations could be eased. In addition, the cumula-
tive effects of dumping, subsidies, and all other government support or
restriction could be amenable to consolidated industry-wide proceedings.
Thus, long-term foreign industrial policies, targeting, subsidies, or re-
strictions in their home or other markets could be open to challenge for
their eventual impact in United States markets. Changes along these
lines could be made consistent with GATT Article VI but United States
trade law would need significant amendment by Congress."'
79. For a summary and sources see Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial Trade Policy,
supra note 2, at 160-63 n.4650. See generally Bruce E. Clubb, U.S. Foreign Trade Law
(1991); Peter Ehrenhaft & Charlotte Meriwether, The Trade Agreements Act of 1979:
Small Aid for Trade? 58 Tul. L. Rev. 1107 (1984).
80. See generally Clubb, supra note 79. But see generally Robert Krupka, et al., Sec-
tion 337 and the GA7T The Problem or the Solution? 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 779 (1993);
Anne L. Spangler, Note, Intellectual Property Protection and Import Trade: Making Sec-
tion 337 Consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 43 Hastings LJ.
217 (1991).
81. It should be emphasized that scale economies are widespread in modern manufac-
turing technology, and that discounting (or dumping) opportunities are therefore very
common. See Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade Policy, supra note 2, at 154 chart
1A. When many other national industrial policies add extra cost reduction, favorable
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To strengthen prospects of relief, United States international trade
agencies should assist actively in unfair-trade-practice investigations, and
they should help to cover the cost and risk of litigation for many United
States plaintiffs. Within approximately thirty to forty days, Congress
should establish rapid relief procedures so that defendant foreign compa-
nies and their United States importers would face heavy bonding require-
ments to guarantee any necessary relief or damages. Such legislation
should encourage prompt settlement alternatives that would quickly
eliminate threats of injury to United States industries and companies. If
Congress took all of these measures, GATT and United States trade-law
remedies against unfair-trade-practices in international commerce could
become more effective and reliable, and the United States might cut back
excessive overall imports into the United States 2 MNCs, import lobbies,
and those favoring unilateral United States free-trade policies would re-
gard such changes as controversial, however. But, unless a major liberal-
ization occurs in United States government support for unfair-trade-
practice proceedings, these remedies will continue to be rather limited
and unreliable for United States companies.
In this context, however, it should be emphasized that the Uruguay
Round-GATT 1994 agreement further limits United States companies'
ability to use unfair-trade-practice remedies under GATT and United
States trade law. 3 Thus, the GATT 1994 deal inhibits the revival and
expansion of such proceedings as measures to cut back on excessive im-
ports into the United States. NAFTA raises similar issues, and clarifica-
tion is needed in order to preserve access for United States companies to
unfair-trade-practice relief.8 4
financing, or risk protection, the incentives and dangers of dumping into large, higher
wage, and open markets like the U.S. become a very serious problem for its manufactur-
ing industries. Further, current U.S. trade law requires that counter vailable subsidies
must be closely related to exporting. Thus, it has been hard for many U.S. companies to
prevail, even if they can show significant injury from dumping and/or subsidies. As
Thomas E. Bennett of the Torrington Company remarked, "[e]ven after winning we con-
tinue to be faced with a long and expensive appeal process. So far we have spent more
than $10 million and diverted substantial amounts of critical corporate resources to sup-
port these activities." World Trade at the Crossroads: The Uruguay Round, GATT and
Beyond 148 (Robert W. Jerome, ed., 1992).
82. If these improvements in U.S. unfair-trade-practice law administration were im-
plemented, U.S. domestic industry would gain from greater certainty, and the reduction
of legal costs and inhibitions while leading to more reliable trading flows, with less distor-
tion from injurious foreign subsidies and discounting practices. This outcome is consis-
tent with the spirit of the original GATT Article VI (1947).
83. For a brief summary, see Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade Policy, supra
note 2, app. 1. See generally World Trade at the Crossroads, supra note 81.
84. Under NAFTA dispute settlement provisions, U.S. investors in Mexico are given
relatively strong safeguards, including access to international arbitral panels. Even some
environmental interests could make complaints to relevant committees, or a tri-national
commission under the Environmental Side Accord. In anti-dumping and countervailing
duty cases, however, the U.S.-Canada FTA procedures are applied, i.e., final U.S. or
Mexican determinations under their law are subject to binding tri-national review panels.
This approach substantially weakens the U.S. anti-dumping and CVD remedies for U.S.
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5. Supervising and Improving the NAFTA Relationship
Clinton's support of NAFTA reflects strong sympathy for the Mexi-
can government's efforts to open their economy, encourage outside in-
vestment, and improve economic-growth prospects.85 In Mexico,
NAFTA mobilized broad spectrum support; safeguard provisions includ-
ing "snap back" tariff relief options, have reduced their main risks that
smaller, less efficient companies and farmers could suffer significant dis-
ruption. Mexican concessions to a larger role for United States invest-
ments could be permanent, however, unless a major change in Mexican
politics and orientation occurs.
The NAFTA deal as currently negotiated, including the Clinton Side
Agreements, allows more risk for United States labor, agricultural, and
small business interests.8 6 Because United States tariffs are already low
or non-existent, the NAFTA "snap back" tariff provisions are relatively
insignificant to United States interests. How much displacement will oc-
cur is highly controversial. Because Mexican labor costs are much lower
for many United States industries, it seems reasonable to expect more
United States companies to relocate to Mexico. More Mexican or third-
party-owned companies will expand their exports to the United States.
Cost reduction potentials, however, are efficiency gains for some inter-
ests. Many United States companies have expressed a desire for conve-
nient, low-wage processing plant opportunities in Mexico and elsewhere
in the Americas as an offset to low wage opportunities in Asia for Japa-
nese and other East Asian companies. Thus, the United States will need
reasonably strong rules-of-origin requirements in NAFTA to prevent
East Asian companies from simply passing their exports through Mex-
companies, unless U.S. government agencies press hard in the panel process in support of
domestic U.S. interests. In recent years, at least, no such support has been forthcoming
in most situations. Unfortunately, the Side Accords on Labor and Import Surges merely
set up a tri-national commission for labor cooperation with a small secretariat, with no
private rights of action. For the Side Accord texts see supra note 59.
85. Clinton also claimed that NAFTA will create 200,000 U.S. jobs within two years,
a million within five years and "many more jobs than will be lost."
86. For constrasting analyses, see generally Leslie Glick, Understanding the North
American Free Trade Agreement (1993); Paul Wonnacott, NAFTA Scorecard, Wall St.
J., Sept. 30, 1993, at A18. Most observers agree that United States MNCs and investors
could gain substantially, but job impact estimates vary considerably. Proponents claim
net U.S. job gains, though conceding limited losses. Those opposing NAFTA in the U.S.
fear that up to six million jobs will be lost in manufacturing, agriculture, and others in
badly affected communities, without that much gain in services and management jobs.
Mexican business and labor interests largely believe their country will gain substantially,
even though some displacement of higher cost firms will occur. But, the "snap back"
tariff relief provisions, and longer implementation schedules for Mexico, gives them sub-
stantial safeguard relief. On balance, most U.S. business interests favor NAFTA, and are
willing to shift manufacturing jobs to lower wage countries for greater efficiency and
profits. Some argue that Mexico and the Americas can be for the U.S. like Southeast
Asia has been for Japan-part of an expanding co-prosperity sphere. A lot will depend
on how the U.S. and Mexico supervise NAFTA. These economic outcomes will be influ-
enced substantially by the conduct of both governments.
19941 2033
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ico. The tentative rules-of-origin requirements are somewhat ambiguous,
and should be tightened up.
The problems with NAFTA for United States interests arise in three
areas. The first is Import Surges and Trade Imbalances. The Clinton
Side Agreement on Import Surges and Worker Rights merely provides
for mutual consultation by the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Does
this mean that the United States reserves the right to assert unilaterally
United States unfair-trade-practice or balance-of-payments remedies
against Mexico? Or, does the United States preclude itself from serious
response? Clarification is needed.87 The second area is Worker Rights
and Labor Protection. The Clinton Side Agreements merely establish a
joint Council of the three Labor Ministers or Secretaries with a small
investigative secretariat. Each country pledges to enforce its own laws
and to study complaints and problems together. United States labor un-
ions regard this as quite inadequate. Clearly, United States labor sees a
risk of substantial job losses if American plants move to Mexico, without
enough offset in new production jobs in the United States. Some United
States farming interests fear a shift of agricultural production to Mexico
and other warm countries south of the border. But, United States com-
panies will create some new service and financial jobs in the United
States to handle enlarged tourism and investment opportunities with
Mexico. The Worker Rights Side Agreements will gradually improve
Mexican working conditions and wages, but they will not prevent sub-
stantial job shifts and displacement from occurring. 8 The third area is
Environmental Interests and Weakened Regulation. Environmental or-
ganizations in the United States worry that NAFTA could create a lower
common denominator of reduced environmental standards. The Clinton
Side Agreements establish an Environmental Council and Commission,
with multibillion dollar funding for clean up projects in Mexico. Major-
ity Leader Gephart proposed a two to four percent border transactions
fee for financing, but the Clinton administration prefers to sell bonds for
this purpose. What share will be sold by the United States and Mexico?
Will payments be guaranteed, and by which governments? Now United
States environmental lobbies are divided on NAFTA. Some environ-
mentalists accept the deal because it provides collaboration on joint
problems. Others still strongly oppose NAFTA, because United States
87. Each country preserves the right to its own laws regulating labor and trade, in-
cluding anti-dumping and CVD for subsidies. Under U.S. law this allows the U.S. gov-
ernment trade agencies to supervise remedies. And yet, NAFTA dispute resolution
provisions, like the U.S.-Canada FTA, call for delegating appeals on disputes to tri-na.
tional panels for resolution. This evidently allows leeway for governmental and political
involvement at the highest levels when serious trade conflicts arise. Since both Mexican
and U.S. Presidents now support NAFTA, this suggests mutual accommodation may be
sought. But Canada's recent election of a new liberal government, much less involved in
NAFTA sponsorship, indicates that Canada could be tougher in impasse bargaining. See
Clyde H. Farnsworth, Chretien Says He Wants Changes in Trade Accord, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 28, 1993, at A20.
88. See Side Accords, supra note 59, along with contrasting views, supra note 86.
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companies can use relocation to Mexico as leverage to resist or weaken
environmental standards, and because they want to restrict trade with
countries that have low environmental-protection standards.8 9
Understandably, most United States labor interests strongly oppose
NAFTA, along with many environmentalists, some agricultural inter-
ests, and some smaller companies in the United States that are unable to
relocate plants south of the border. On the other hand, most MNCs and
financial interests favor NAFTA, and they favor similar agreements with
other countries in the Americas. The Side Agreements controversy is
still unresolved, however, particularly with respect to Import Surges.
More safeguard relief to the United States and Canada could be guaran-
teed through explicit understandings that unfair-trade-practice remedies
and correctives for serious trade imbalances shall be unaffected by
NAFTA.90
How will NAFTA affect United States revenue tariffs or VAT-waiver
correctives? With respect to new revenue tariffs in the ten to fifteen per-
cent range, NAFTA might seem to preclude additional United States
tariffs now. Thus, Mexico and Canada could be inside the tent of
NAFTA before the United States raises significant revenue tariffs. VAT-
waiver correctives are another matter, however, and a new United States
VAT-waiver corrective tax would merely adjust for waiver in the home
country of foreign production. Thus, NAFTA would not preclude a
VAT-waiver corrective for Mexican or Canadian exports into the United
States9'
6. Correcting Uruguay GATT Round Shortcomings
The Uruguay GATT Round really began in the early 1980s as a multi-
faceted effort to expand free-trade into agriculture and services, reduce
tariffs on goods for NICs, reduce NTBs, and generally improve the
89. Environmental interests in the U.S. are sharply divided on NAFTA, even after
the Side Accord on Environment, Sept. 14, 1993, was released. But, some free-traders
want environmental support. See generally John Jackson, World Trade Rules and Envi-
ronmental Policies Congruence or Conflict?, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1227 (1992);
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protectio of the Environment. Ir-
reconcilable Conflict?, 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 700 (Oct. 1992). And yet, many environmental
problems are global in scope, which are difficult for a liberal trading order to deal with
responsibly. See generally Christopher D. Stone, Beyond Rio: "Insuring" Against Global
Warming, 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 445 (July 1992).
90. More effective unfair-trade-practice relief could be assured by a U.S. administra-
tion determined to implement stronger remedies and safeguarding. This would require
strong U.S. supervision of expanding trade flows under NAFTA. Most of the U.S. labor
anxiety about NAFTA flows from a lack of confidence that such supervision will be
forthcoming, and from the relatively weak Side Accords on Labor and Import Surges,
together with less safeguarding for U.S. industries than for Mexican industries in the
basic NAFTA agreement. By contrst, the Bush administration placed a greater priority
on safeguarding U.S. investor and MNC interests in Mexico.
91. Like the EC, Mexico has a 15 percent VAT. Thus, any new U.S. VAT or VAT-
waiver corrective would serve the function of taxing manufactured goods from those ar-
eas in a manner comparable to U.S. manufactured exports to those areas.
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world-trade system. The agenda for the Uruguay GATT Round was not
settled until 1985, when many task forces and working parties were es-
tablished.92 Unfortunately, at the outset, United States trade negotiators
made a crucial concession with far-reaching impact in limiting results for
the Round when they proposed "standstill" as the basis for a modus
vivendi on multilateral trade until such time as the GATT Round might
be concluded. This concession meant that the United States pledged not
to increase significantly the use of its unfair-trade-practice remedies, or
other trade restrictions, to achieve reasonable trade balance. Clearly, the
most open major market failed to use its leverage as the largest importer
and trade-deficit nation in the world. The United States failed to use its
strongest moral and economic weapon to enforce effective reciprocity.
Having already conceded more openness to its markets in previous
GATT Rounds, the United States had little remaining bargaining power
to force concessions from Japan, the EC, NICs, and LDCs when it tied
its own hands with the standstill pledge. The United States could have
achieved more with the GATT Round in 1986-93 if it had systematically
used anti-dumping, countervailing duty, section 301, and/or import
surcharge remedies along with multilateral bargaining. 93 When the
United States had eliminated excessive trade and current-account defi-
cits, a more level field of trade flows would have been a sounder basis for
Uruguay GATT Round bargaining.
Yet, at this stage in the evolution of post-World War II trade patterns,
with more than 132 independent trading nations in the global commu-
nity, it is not surprising that that they could achieve only modest results
on any multilateral consensus basis.94 With an unlevel playing field hav-
ing been strongly established throughout GATT's history (1947-93), in-
92. See sources cited supra notes 45, 48.
93. Thus, the U.S. could have used a more active, Baldridge-Prestowitz trade bar-
gaining strategy, with more MITI-style collaboration between U.S. government and in-
dustry. In this way, the Uruguay GATT Round would have focused more upon
establishing equal overall U.S. trade flows, and the elimination of large U.S. trade deficits
with key trade partners. Weakened U.S. industries could have been encouraged to use
anti-dumping, CVD, and § 301 proceedings, and the U.S. government should have sup-
ported them, with § 122 (GATT Article XII) balance-of-payments surcharge leverage
used to achieve real and prompt progress.
None of this firmness would have been inconsistent with the useful and primary goals
of the Uruguay GATT Round, i.e., more openness and equal trading conditions for agri-
culture, gains in access for services, reduced tariffs by the NICs and many LDCs, less use
of non-tariff barriers, and stronger protection for intellectual property. Greater U.S.
toughness in trade bargaining, using its leverage as the world's biggest importer, would
have assured more respect and faster results with the main items on the U.S. trade
agenda.
94. An incomplete consensus on world trade is actually a blessing. The established
GATT framework (1947), despite greater leeway given for subsidies and restrictions by
developing countries, still contained (at least prior to the possible implementation of the
1994 Uruguay Round changes) enough flexibility for a large, powerful nation with large
markets like the U.S., to adequately defend and safeguard its vital economic interests.
What the U.S. should have done in the mid-1980s, i.e., implementing a stronger indus-
trial-trade policy, can still be done today, but the GATT (1994) agreement and its new
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cluding seven previous rounds of uneven tariff and trade-barrier
reductions and strong UNCTAD challenges, major GATT realignment
or leveling was unrealistic. Many nations remain committed to strong
industrial-development strategies, including extensive subsidies, selective
trade restrictions, and catch-up efforts. It would be naive to think that
most nations would now take a "hands off" approach to international
trade and service flows. Accordingly, the United States must accept the
fact that widespread distortions, unequal openness, and varied subsidies
are part of the world trade landscape.95 Many large producers in the
global marketplace experience substantial scale economies, face declining
costs, and use extensive price discounting to enhance sales and profits.96
So, what evaluation should be made of the Uruguay GATT Round
agreement of December 1993? Overall, the Uruguay Round deal makes
modest movement toward somewhat freer-trade in goods and some serv-
ices, and it tries to limit and weaken offsets for dumping, subsidies, and
unfair-trade-practices by national trade law authorities.97 The GATT
(1994) agreement continues to prefer developing countries; they enjoy
substantially more latitude for subsidies, restrictions, and industrial poli-
cies. Unfortunately, in agriculture the gains for freer markets and reduc-
ing subsidies are rather small and disappointing to most large exporters,
such as the United States and Cairns group countries.9" Additionally,
most developing nations retain, not unreasonably, strong control over
WTO (with majority rule voting and dispute settlement panels) makes a stronger U.S.
trade policy more difficult to achieve.
95. The U.S. cannot realistically expect most nations to open up to imports as com-
pletely as the U.S., or even to the same extent as European community nations in the
post-Maastricht environment after 1992. Many developing nations must use subsidies,
tariffs, and/or other restrictions to nurture their industrial progress as did the U.S. from
1791 until after World War II. While the U.S. should accept this industrial fact of life
with realistic compassion for the needs of others, the U.S. need not straight-jacket itself
into asymmetrical trade openness with many provisions in the Uruguay Round agree-
ment that are bad for U.S. industry, that would cripple competitiveness, and that would
prevent a broad renewal of economic growth for America.
96. The facts of widespread scale economies, declining cost surveys, and a natural
opportunity for marginal cost discounting are built into the world marketplace. It is the
nature of modem technology that extensive scale economies arise in many fields of pro-
duction, transport, and services. Thus, continuing care must be taken by U.S. industry
and by its international trade agencies to offset and remedy the disruptive effects of such
discounting when they threaten or cause significant injury or displacement for U.S. indus-
tries and companies.
97. See the four page summary of the Dunkel draft Uruguay Round Agreement in
Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade Policy, supra note 2, app. 1, Implications of the
GATT 1994 Agreement; the excellent critical summary by Economic Strategy Institute
experts, World Trade at the CrossRoads: The Uruguay Round, GATT, and Beyond
(Robert W. Jerome ed. 1991).
98. As compared to the earlier U.S. and Cairns group hopes for major reductions in
agricultural subsidies (especially by the EC and its CAP), the Blair House Accord of
December, 1992, was a great retreat. Only limited reductions, spread over six years, are
contemplated, and EC trade negotiators have been seeking to relax them further. See
Root 7th ed., supra note 4, at 203-11, 263-64; and sources cited supra note 18.
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their financial and service markets. So what interests gain, if any, from
the Dunkel draft GATT Round agreement?
MNCs gain by consolidating their influence and limiting national
trade policies that could disrupt their interests.99 GATT panelists and
officials gain more authority over trade flows, and become increasingly
important as arbiters and mediators of inter-national trading disputes.
GATT will be supplemented for most of its membership by a new World
Trade Organization, with a continuing executive secretariat, self-perpetu-
ating committees, and an international corps of trade-expert panelists
whose travel expenses and fees are guaranteed."° This framework would
be locked into place, and tends to straight-jacket United States trading
relationships into the current, largely unlevel playing field of accumu-
lated GATT provisions and prior agreements.
And what about the goals for United States trade policy in the
1990s?" Does the GATT (1994) help to eliminate promptly United
States trade and current-account deficits, or promote renewed growth of
United States manufacturing, services, and technology? The answer is
no. What is the probable impact on overall United States trade of the
Uruguay Round? The Uruguay GATT agreement seems most likely to
lock into place the present asymmetrically-open GATT trading regime.
It will weaken United States manufacturing somewhat more, and allow
only limited, insecure gains in services. While the United States hoped
originally in the Uruguay Round for a major expansion of agricultural
exports, the Blair House Accord offers only modest gains over a number
of years. Even this limited agricultural achievement is threatened by re-
cent French government intransigence in pressing the EC hard to limit
the Blair House Accord. Finally, by accepting the GATT (1994) deal
the United States further erodes its ability to regulate imports and unfair-
99. MNCs have a vital interest in the outcome of the Uruguay GATT Round, see
supra note 11, but so do most national governments, working people, farmers, smaller
business, and all citizens. By reducing the "safeguarding limits" placed on international
trade flows that were built into the original GATT in 1947, including Articles VI, XII,
XVI, XVIII, XIX, and XXI, the GATT (1994) deal tips the balance too far in the MNC
direction. This circumstance helps to explain why the base of national interest group
support for the Uruguay Round outcome is rather narrow, i.e., MNCs, their trade law-
yers, and a limited network of allied supporters.
100. See the GATT (1994), in particular MTN/FA II A2, Understanding on the Set-
tlement of Disputes. This language provides:
8. Composition of Panels
Panels shall be composed of well qualified governmental or non-governmental
individuals, including persons who have served on or presented a case to a
GATT panel, served as a representative to the GATT or in the GATT Secreta-
riat, taught or published on international trade law or policy, or served as a
senior trade policy official of a contracting party. The Secretariat shall maintain
and up-date an indicative list of panelists, with grandfather protection for the
GATT panelists listed 12/30/84.
GATT art. 8.4, MTN/FA II-A2, at 6-7. These charming provisions suggest the flavor of
in-group, mutual support from the existing cadre of GATT experts.
101. For a summary of the goals appropriate for U.S. trade policies, see supra notes 62-
65 and accompanying text.
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trade-practices, and to limit excessive trade and current-account deficits.
On balance, the Uruguay GATT Round agreement of 1994 is not ade-
quate trade policy for United States interests now.
The United States was unwise to accept the entire Dunkel draft agree-
ment." 2 The most troublesome parts of the agreement for the United
States, and for many other nations, are the supranational World Trade
Organization and the proposed new Dispute Resolution panels and pro-
cedures. The World Trade Organization could easily become a "Super
Brussels" Commission of World Trade Officials that may largely displace
and emasculate United States international trade regulation authority,
while allowing greater scope for subsidies and industrial policy support
to continue for the EC, Japan, NICs, and LDCs.' °3
In addition, the Antidumping, Subsidies, and Safeguard provisions of
the GATT (1994) deal are bad for United States interests, because they
seriously weaken United States offsets and responses to widespread dis-
counting and subsidies by foreign companies and governments.0'° The
established GATT Article VI (1947) provisions are sufficient for United
States purposes, allow enough leeway, and current GATT panels work
well enough as vehicles for mutual accommodation and compromise
when trade disputes arise. Stripped of these unnecessary, dangerous, and
excessive restrictions upon United States trade policy, the remaining por-
tions of the Dunkel draft, including the associated Blair House Accord,
would have been a modest, not unreasonable gain for United States trade
interests.
102. The Uruguay Round negotiating process was extremely ambitious and mul-
tifaceted. See sources cited supra note 97.
103. Thus, the USTR's staff in the U.S. collaborated with counterpart trade negotiat-
ing agencies and staffs from many other countries to construct an insider's MNC oriented
world trade club, with strong self-perpetuating momentum. Such an arrangement is
completely inimical to U.S. national, economic, industrial, labor, agricultural, and trade
interests. Even a strong free trade economist like Jagdish Bhagwati observed recently:
[S]urely one cannot suppress the thought that our hands are already full and
our backs overburdened enough by the difficulty of bringing the Uruguay
Round to a successful conclusion; the grandiose [MTO] talks could prove diver-
sionary and threaten the chances of the Round's success.
Jagdish Bhagwati, The World Trading System at Risk 97 (1991). Like many trade ex-
perts, he concluded that a more focused, limited agreement was more appropriate for the
GATT Round.
104. Unfortunately, the 1994 Uruguay Round agreement, with respect to Antidump-
ing, Subsidies, and Safeguards provides no real gains for U.S. manufacturing or indus-
tries, and only weakens remedies that already exist under U.S. law. Furthermore, § 301
of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, not to mention Super 301, Omnibus Trade Act of 1988,
would be emasculated by requiring, in effect, that all significant international trade dis-
putes be settled by GATT panels.
Other serious shortcomings in the Uruguay GATT Round Agreement (1994) involve
the Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. The widely hoped-for
strengthening of U.S. intellectual property rights abroad is quite modest, while U.S. trade
negotiators agreed to weaken § 337 under U.S. law (what many consider the most readily
enforceable remedy against foreign unfair trade practices). This trade-off is adverse to
U.S. industrial interests.
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When the EC insisted upon the WTO and further weakening of the
Blair House Accord on agriculture, the United States should have let the
Uruguay GATT Round fail, and it should have allowed its fast-track
negotiating authority to expire. 1°5 This eigth Uruguay GATT Round
absorbed four years of preliminary negotiations and eight years of formal
negotiations. Frankly, it is unrealistic to expect that much from grand,
across-the-board multilateral trade negotiations involving 132 nations.
The full-scale comprehensive GATT Round process has probably run its
historical course, and more limited, special-sector agreements, regional
trade areas, and bilateral negotiations will be more productive. No tears
should have been wasted if the Dunkel draft GATT agreement foun-
dered altogether, or if it merely achieved more modest results. Earlier
GATT Rounds, especially the first six through 1967, fulfilled an impor-
tant Bretton-Woods aspiration at the close of World War II. Trade rap-
idly expanded among OECD nations and many developing countries.
The free world prospered, and it was their joint prosperity, in compari-
son to the USSR and most communist countries that won the Cold War.
Nonetheless, a more open world economy is now strongly established,
with market-oriented policies dominant almost everywhere. MNCs and
business enterprises are well entrenched, and the world is effectively inte-
grated into a global economy. 10 6
105. A frequent mistake in U.S. trade bargaining has been over-eagerness for a deal.
In any deal-making situation, the party committed to rapid conclusion, at any price, is
likely to get the short end of the stick. When George Bush rushed to negotiate the
NAFTA deal in fourteen months so that it could be completed for the 1992 elections, a
less successful trade deal that was more favorable to Mexico could be anticipated. In
contrast, the U.S.-Canada FTA took almost four years, and it was mainly Canadians who
later complained about the deal.
Unfortunately, USTR Mickey Kantor "promised to finish the Uruguay Round by
Dec. 15, 1993," for the Clinton administration. See Bruce Stokes, In Your Face, Nat'l J.,
Aug. 21, 1993, at 2069. The U.S. government thereby weakened its bargaining leverage
to hold out for significant improvements and modifications in the Dunkel draft agree-
ment. By contrast, the French, EC, and Japan have been more patient and tougher trade
bargainers over the years.
A tradition grew up in previous GATT Rounds that the U.S. would take a leadership
role, serving as demandeur, and make important final concessions, more than other coun-
tries, to save the GATT Round, and preserve the liberal trade order. Unfortunately, this
repeated expectation leads others to rely upon U.S. concessions at the end, with fast-track
authority from the U.S. Congress serving as the effective termination date for GATT
negotiations. This time the U.S. should have been tougher and smarter: No GATT with-
out Blair House; eliminating WTO and Dispute Settlement, Subsidies, Antidumping, and
Safeguard.
So what? The established GATT (1947) system was not that bad, with enough room
for maneuver, so that U.S. industrial rejuvenation, tougher trade bargaining, and a trade
balancing policy could still be implemented successfully. But, for the U.S. to accept a
gravely flawed Dunkel draft Uruguay Round deal, that substantially impairs the Ameri-
can industrial recovery effort, for some doubtful, largely illusory gains, was stupid.
106. Recent trends illustrate the strengthened environment for MNCs and global busi-
ness enterprise. See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Transnational Corporations and De-
veloping Public International Law, 1983 Duke L.J. 748 (1983); John Daniels & Lee H.
Radebaugh, International Business: Environments and Operations (4th ed., 1987); Patri-
cia McKinstry Robin, The Bit Won't Bite: The American Bilateral Investment Treaty
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The New World Order is based on a broad network of national legal
institutions in most countries that increasingly respects individual and
corporate enterprise, sensible property rights, and, within reason, market
dynamics. International banking, capital movements, and the IMF pro-
vide a strong, diversified credit and financial network. And the main
disciplines for trade and investment activity are the logic of markets, pro-
ductive competition, and the drive for efficiency. This global system is
not going to collapse; it has too much momentum, rooted in the strong
economic self-interest of most nations. 107
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
What are the most productive United States trade policy options in the
1990s? The main goals should be to eliminate United States trade and
current-account deficits; rejuvenate United States industrial growth, ex-
ports, and prosperity; offset foreign industrial policies, subsidies, restric-
tions; and build a more productive partnership between industries and
the American government."08
1. Final implementation of the Uruguay Gatt Agreement is sched-
uled for completion in 1995. At best, the United States can only expect
very limited gains from these GATT arrangements. Although some
United States companies might achieve modest export openings in the
agriculture and services area, the United States must not retreat from the
Blair House Accord concessions on agriculture made by the EC in De-
cember, 1992. Some portions of the Dunkel draft agreement proposed in
December, 1992, should have been rejected by the United States, particu-
Program, 33 Am. U. L. Rev. 93 ( 1984); Bruno Solnik, International Investments (198);
Detlev F. Vagts & Kenneth Propp, Book Review, 85 Am. J. int'l L. 398 (1991) (reviewing
Sidney Dell, The United Nations and Intern'l Business (1990)). But see Robert Kuttner,
Market, State, and Dystopia, 15 American Prospect 87 (1993) (critiquing of the dangers
in an excessively "marketized society" with too much human insecurity and pressures for
reduced wages).
107. Some Uruguay GATT Round enthusiasts feared the world economy faced drastic
breakdown or severe trade wars if the Dunkel draft GATT agreements are not accepted
in total. See Peter Sutherland, If GATT Fails, We All Lose, Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1993, at
A20. He wrote that the future of the world's new democracies and a secure and effective
trading system could be at stake; that the multi-lateral system that had created prosperity
in the 1950s through the 1970s is collapsing. See id. This is greatly overblown rhetoric.
The world's trading system, based on the Bretton Woods heritage, is now stronger, and
more secure than ever. At stake, really, in the Uruguay Round controversy, is whether a
GATT (1947) system, workable with some unfortunate asymmetries, but forgiving flexi-
bility, should have been transformed into a monster-a more rigid, third world domi-
nated WTO, with entrenched asymmetries that greatly disadvantage the U.S., and some
other advanced industrial countries to a lesser degree.
The Dunkel draft was a bad trade deal for the U.S., and it should have been greatly
reduced in scope by stripping out the dangerous features. If this sensible cutting down to
size were done, a limited GATT Round deal based upon more tariff cutting, modest
opening, and improved flexibility made sense. Sutherland was dead wrong in saying that
the round is a cohesive whole. This self-serving rigidity should have been rejected by the
world community, and especially by the United States.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30 and 64-69.
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larly the burdensome and unnecessary WTO and Dispute Resolution
provisions, together with the Anti-dumping, Subsidies, and Safeguards
provisions. All these features significantly weaken United States trade
law, and help erode further the position of United States manufacturing
in world markets. If the Uruguay GATT round finally had failed in
1993, it would have been no great loss. Other policy avenues, bilateral
and regional, will be more productive, and must deal more effectively
with the serious asymmetry problems that burden the United States in
current global competition.' 0 9
2. NAFTA is an important regional relationship for the United
States that can, if wisely supervised, lead to expanding, mutually bal-
anced trade in the Americas generally. The NAFTA Side Agreements
should be strengthened, however, and growing trade in the Americas
must be closely supervised by the United States to enforce mutual trade
balance and substantial net benefits to all participating countries."o
3. Bilateral trade relationships with sustained trade surplus coun-
tries, particularly Japan and China, must be greatly improved. Merely
asking for additional market opening is not good enough, and has failed
so far. Imports into the United States from these countries should be
reduced by import restrictions until reasonable balance is established."'
109. See supra text accompanying notes 92-107.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 85-91.
111. The U.S. has allowed bilateral imbalance problems, particularly with Japan and
China, to get out of hand. The U.S. has no right to complain about Japanese or Chinese
industrial policies, import supervision, or their skillful self-improvement. Instead, we
should congratulate their success, and intelligently emulate them. This means a compre-
hensive U.S. industrial rejuvenation effort, tougher trade policies, and enforcing overall
trade balance. The U.S. has a right to do what Japan has shown is the best overall
strategy for continuing, high tech progress, and industrial development.
In 1983, this author learned in a previous sabbatical to Japan (the year President Rea-
gan enjoyed a successful visit to Tokyo, when the U.S.-Japan relationship was quite
friendly) what is, in this author's opinion, the best way to deal with the Japan-U.S. trade
imbalance. First, never accuse the Japanese of bad faith, sneakiness, or unfairness in
trade relations. This tactic only brings them to quiet rage. Japanese people are extremely
polite, and they hate confrontation; such behavior lacks dignity, a fundamental require-
ment of good, responsible behavior. The best way to deal with Japan is to accentuate the
positive. Admire Japan's hard work, thrift, engineering, and business-government collab-
oration. Express eagerness to learn helpful lessons from Japan, as Japan learned helpful
things from America in the Meiji, MacArthur, and 1950s eras. Then say, in passing, that
the U.S. has serious social problems. We have excessive unemployment and poverty. To
the Japanese, this is shocking and tragic social failure and a lack of healthy cohesion.
Then say that America must solve these problems, and eliminate widespread U.S. unem-
ployment. Trade and current-account deficits in the U.S. must be eliminated, as Japan
well understands from their own experience. Japanese companies in America are good
citizens, often more responsible than U.S. companies. The U.S. must ask the cooperation
of all companies in America, wherever based, to work with the U.S. government in solv-
ing the excessive import, insufficient export problem. We will be fair. Japanese compa-
nies can make helpful suggestions. Thank you for your kind understanding.
Then, the U.S. Department of Commerce, which should be reorganized as a Depart-
ment of Industry, Technology and Trade-DITT, and the USTR should work out a 36
month program by which Japan, China, and Taiwan can help eliminate their large trade
deficits. Imports from these countries (but not U.S.-based production by their compa-
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4. Unfair trade-practice-enforcement by the United States should be
strengthened. More rapid provisional relief and effective settlements
should be worked out. The United States Department of Commerce
should become an active investigative partner with American industries
and trade associations in dealing with widespread foreign subsidies, re-
strictions, and discounts that have affected many United States industries
and companies and that gradually reduced the role for United States in-
dustry in many markets. The United States Department of Commerce
should help work out extensive rejuvenation programs for many United
States industries, trade associations, and American financial institutions.
nies) will be phased down by 15 percent annually until bilateral trade balance is achieved.
Statutory authority for this action comes from §§ 122 and 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of
1974. Thereafter, under § 2202 of the Omnibus Trade At of 1988, DITI and the USTR
will closely supervise and prevent bilateral trade balances from getting out of hand in any
other important trading relationship. These import reductions are not matters for negoti-
ation.
A great deal of effort by the U.S. was put into the so-called Structural Impediments
Initiative. This effort produced talk, promises of opening, but no meaningful results or
change in trade flows. The same game has been renewed with the so-called Framework
talks. Asking the Japanese to open their markets hasn't worked, nor does it make sense
to set quotas for expanded exports into Japan. This is too confrontational for Japan. It is
the wrong approach. Respect Japan's right to buy what they like, and regulate their own
imports. But insist on the reciprocal right of the U.S. to cut excessive imports from large
trade surplus countries until a reasonable bilateral trade balance is restored. This is
sound internal policy Japanese style.
For Japanese history, economic policies, and overall performance, see Lovett, World
Trade Rivalry, supra note 1, at 32, 79. Also, for highlights, see generally William Lock-
wood, The Economic Development of Japan: Growth and Structural Change 1868-1938
(1954); William Lockwood, The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan (1965); Thomas
K. McCraw, America versus Japan (1986); and Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Jap-
anese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation (1989). In addition, for recent
sources, see Christopher Wood, The Bubble Economy: Japan's Extraordinary Specula-
tive Boom of the '80s and the Dramatic Bust of the 90s (1992); John 0. Haley, Luck. Law
Culture and Trade: The Intractability of United States-Japan Trade Conflict, 22 Cornell
Int'l L.J. 403 (1989); Michael W. Punke, Structural Impediments to United States-Japa-
nese Trade: The Collision of Culture and Law, 23 Cornell Int'l L.J. 55 (1990); Gary R.
Saxonhouse, Japan, S11 and the International harmonization of Domestic Economic Prac-
tices, 12 Mich. J. Int'l L. 450 (1991); Keith Bradsher, U.S. and Japan Open Talks on New
Trade Framework, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1993, at 35; Bob Davis & Jathon Sapsford,
Japan Escapes U.S. Sanctions, Offering Plan to Open Up Public-Works Market, Wall St.
J., Oct. 27, 1993, at A2; Carla A. Hills, Targets Won't Open Japanese Markets, Wall St.
J., June 11, 1993, at A10; Andrew Pollack, U.S.-Japan Trade Talks Bog Down, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 23, 1993, at 45; David E. Sanger, Moderate Meddling; From Asia, Models for
Growing Economies, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1993, at E4; Jacob M. Schlesinger & Clay
Chandler, While Change Roars Through Japanese Politics, Real Power Still Lies in Hands
of Bureaucrats, Wall St. J., June 25, 1993, at A6; James Sterngold, Japan's Leading Par-
ties Crushed in Tokyo Elections, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1993, at A3; The Trade Trio Talk-
ing Tough with Japan, Bus. Week, Sept. 27, 1993, at 84; David Wessel & Terrence Roth,
U.S. and Japanese Trade Negotiators Angle for Advantage Ahead of Talks, Wall St. J.,
June 4, 1993, at A2.
For U.S.-China trade imbalances the problem is more recent, but there are great struc-
tural similarities. The Chinese have even stronger mercantilist regulation of trade flows,
and are eager to expand on their export-led growth. The U.S. would be wise to enforce
overall trade flow balance with China promptly, before this problem gets more seriously
out of hand.
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Appropriate tax relief and investment encouragement should be focused
on these industries, with the possibility of rejuvenation tariffs to offset
serious accumulated injury to United States industries. More extensive
data on imports, exports, and shipping for all goods and services should
be obtained and regularly reported, so that United States trade balances
and current-account information can be closely monitored on a monthly
reporting basis, with all United States trade partners simultaneously." 2
5. The United States should develop a comprehensive federal VAT in
the twelve to fifteen percent range, comparable to other major industrial
areas. Significant exemptions should be included for food and drugs to
ease the impact on lower income and retired people. Revenues must be
shared equally with state and local governments, and surplus federal rev-
enues should be used to reduce capital gains taxes, reduce corporate taxes
for new investments, and reduce business taxes generally for industry re-
ceiving rejuvenation support. Until the federal VAT is implemented, a
twelve to fifteen percent VAT-waiver corrective charge should be im-
posed on all imports into the United States." 3
6. The United States should develop a GATT-consistent, non-dis-
criminatory, general-revenue tariff of ten percent on all imports of goods
and services into the United States to be phased in over three years to
minimize disruptive impacts. This ten percent general revenue tariff
should be maintained until the United States achieves a national trade
surplus of at least one percent of United States GDP, after which time it
could be relaxed to six to eight percent on all imports.' "'
112. These U.S. unfair-trade-practice remedies, and their leverage for healthy trade
bargaining to correct accumulated asymmetries, should be coordinated with U.S. indus-
trial rejuvenation efforts on a sector-by-sector basis. Overkill should be avoided. This
coordinative restraint should be the responsibility of a new U.S. Department of Industry,
Technology, and Trade, reorganized from the present U.S. Dept. of Commerce. The U.S.
should develop a Japanese-style industry, with government collaboration to improve
American economic growth, achieve fuller employment, and restore overall prosperity.
113. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. Great care must be taken, how-
ever, with any federal VAT, so that large new revenues are not wasted on health-care
largesse. Any VAT reform must be linked to solving the U.S. excessive budget deficit
problem, and collaterally to offsetting the widespread waiver of foreign VATs (which
constitute a serious competitive handicap for U.S. manufacturing industries). Excess rev-
enue creation must be avoided by offsetting cuts in business taxation, lower capital gains
levies, and reduced payroll taxes.
114. During most of U.S. economic history significant tariffs greatly aided U.S. indus-
trial development, especially between 1815-1945, when most of the U.S. industrial growth
toward world leadership occurred. Unfortunately, U.S. industry has been so widely
weakened in recent years that the U.S. should resume this market-oriented general incen-
tive for industrial development. If the U.S. had reacted promptly in the late 1970s to
early 1980s to increasing competitiveness and trade deficit problems, this measure might
not have been needed. But, with widespread deindustrialization and heavier structural
unemployment by the early 1990s, a general-revenue tariff in the 10 percent range is
needed stimulus. Western Europe might want a comparable measure or rejuvenation,
because they have widespread unemployment. Japan's sustained post World War II
growth suggests that they might avoid this measure (informal import restraints still oper-
ate there.) When the U.S. restores healthy trade balance on a sustained basis, these gen-
eral revenue tariffs might be relaxed again. Meanwhile, most lower-wage developing
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If these recommendations are implemented, the United States could
eliminate soon its chronic trade and current-account deficits, and
America's industrial base could be rejuvenated on a broad scale. Exces-
sive imports, and undue consumption generally, would be reduced. Sav-
ings and investment into productive United States industries would be
encouraged. Competitive disruptions from foreign subsidies, restrictions,
and discounting could be offset and neutralized. Within ten years most
of the accumulated, costly consequences of unequally open and asym-
metrical world markets could be alleviated. With economics and trade
along these lines, the United States could resume stronger economic
growth, and achieve fuller employment (more like the United States
prosperity that governed in the 1940s-60s). With renewed growth and
full employment, most American social problems-excessive crime, drug
abuse, demoralization, and ethnic tensions--could be eased substantially,
and the career and income potential for most United States citizens and
families would improve."1 5
countries can still sell into the high-wage markets (though not quite so easily). The basic
rationale for ten percent U.S. revenue tariffs is threefold: (1) to offset accumulated and
excessive U.S. deindustrialization and unemployment; (2) to offset chronic and excessive
U.S. trade and current-account deficits; and (3) to provide a surge of incentives for U.S.
industrial rejuvenation effort. Once these medium-term objectives have been achieved,
these revenue tariffs can be gradually relaxed.
115. As Paul Krugman recently observed:
[T]he slowdown of American productivity growth since the early 1970s be-
comes the most important single fact about our economy. Over the first 70
years of this century, American output per worker rose at an average annual
rate of 2.3 percent. During the 1950s and 1960s that rate was 2.8 percent.
Since 1970, however, our economy has delivered average annual productivity
growth of only 1.2 percent. Had productivity over the last 20 years grown as
fast as it did for the first 70 years of this century, our living standards would
now be at least 25 percent higher than they are.
Paul Krugman, The Age of Diminished Expectations: U.S. Economic Policy in the
1990s 12 (1990).
The key to restored economic growth, and greatly reduced unemployment and social
distress, is a comprehensive rejuvenation of the U.S. industrial base. Americans must
impose self-discipline. We must live within our means for public expenditures, health
care, and imports from abroad. All excessive deficits must be promptly eliminated. For
further insight on these matters, see Kevin Phillips, Boiling Point: Republicans, Demo-
crats, and the Decline of Midle-Class prosperity (1993); Kevin Phillips, The Politics of
Rich and Poor: Wealth and the American Electorate in the Reagan Aftermath (1990); B.
Drummond Ayres, Jr., Washington Mayor Seeks Aid of Guard in Combating Crime, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 23, 1993, at I; Tim W. Ferguson, Pensions: The Shape of Things to Come,
Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1993, at A23; Robert D. Hershey, Jr., New Data Point to Weakening
U.S. Economy, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1993, at D1; Marc Levinson et al., Can Anyone
Spare a Job?, Newsweek, June 14, 1993, at 46; Joann S. Lublin, Companies Plan More Job
Cuts, Survey Indicates, Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1993, at A2; Manufacturing Job Losses Crip-
ple the Economy, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1993, at A30 (letter to editor).

